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ABSTRACT
OPERATIONAL RISK CAPITAL PROVISIONS FOR BANKS AND INSURANCE
COMPANIES
BY
Edoh Fofo Afambo
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Committee chair: Samuel H. Cox
Major Academic Unit: Risk Management and Insurance

This dissertation investigates the implications of using the Advanced
Measurement Approaches (AMA) as a method to assess operational risk capital charges
for banks and insurance companies within Basel II paradigms and with regard to U.S.
regulations. Operational risk has become recognized as a major risk class because of huge
operational losses experienced by many financial firms over the last past decade. Unlike
market risk, credit risk, and insurance risk, for which firms and scholars have designed
efficient methodologies, there are few tools to help analyze and quantify operational risk.
The New Basel Revised Framework for International Convergence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel II) gives substantial flexibility to
internationally active banks to set up their own risk assessment models in the context of
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the Advanced Measurement Approaches. The AMA developed in this thesis uses
actuarial loss models complemented by the extreme value theory to determine the
empirical probability distribution function of the overall capital charge in terms of
various classes of copulas. Publicly available operational risk loss data set is used for the
empirical exercise.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
A look inside the banking industry over the last decade clearly reveals two stylized facts.
On the one hand, increasing complexity of financial technology combined with
deregulation and globalization trends have made banking practices more sophisticated
and challenging. As a result, the industry faced new multifaceted risks envisioned as part
of ‘other risks’ and as such, different from market and credit risk. These include system
security and fraud risks arising from the expansion of e-commerce, system failure risks
on account of the use of highly automated technology, and many other significant risks
resulting from the increased use of outsourcing arrangements and new risk mitigation
techniques such as credit derivatives, swaps, and asset securitization (BCBS, 2003c). On
the other hand, the banking industry all over the world has witnessed a growing number
of insolvencies and experienced high-profile ‘other risks’ losses. In 1998, the press
reported more than US$20 billion of ‘other risk’ losses in financial service firms,
including the insurance industry. These combined facts brought supervisors as well as
banking and insurance executives to view the management of these ‘other risks’ as a
comprehensive practice comparable to the management of credit and market risk (BCBS,
2003c).
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In the quest for solutions to issues raised by these challenging ‘other risks’ faced
by the banking industry, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Committee)
set up, in its June 1999 First Consultative Package, the principle of developing a Pillar
One explicit capital charge for ‘other risks’, such as operational risk. Subsequent to the
consultation process and its own analysis, the Committee adopted a definition of
operational risk in its January 2001 Second Consultative Package and decided that only
this specific risk should be subject to capital charges under Pillar One of the Framework
(Minimum Regulatory Capital Requirements). Additional components of other risks such
as interest rate risk and liquidity risk will be addressed only through Pillar Two
(Supervisory Review Process) and Pillar Three (Market Discipline)1.
The definition of operational risk, formulated by the British Bankers’ Association
(BBA) was refined in the September 2001 Working Paper on the Regulatory Treatment
of Operational Risk, as follows: “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed
internal processes, people and systems, or from external events”. The Committee
specified that the aforementioned definition encompasses legal risk but excludes
systemic, strategic, and reputational risks for the purpose of a minimum regulatory
operational risk capital requirement.
There exist four computational methodologies to determine the regulatory capital
requirements for financial institutions. These include fixed ratios, risk-based capital,
scenario-based approaches2, and probabilistic approaches (IAIS, 2000). In many views
1

2

The Committee believes that, taken together, these three elements (Minimum Regulatory Capital
Requirements, Supervisory Review, and Market Discipline) are the essential pillars of an effective
capital framework (BCBS, 1999).
Under the fixed ratio method, the capital requirement is expressed as a fixed proportion of a proxy for
exposure to risk often an item from the insurer’s balance sheet or profit and loss account.
Under the risk-based capital model, results are determined by applying factors to exposure proxies such
as invested assets risks, reserving risks, just like in the fixed ratio model.
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(see for example IAIS, 2000; KMPG, 2002), probabilistic approaches such as the
Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA), provide the preferred greatest framework for
a meaningful capital requirement characterization. These methodologies use simulations
to determine the full probability distribution of possible outcomes from which the capital
requirement is determined using ruin-probability, expected policyholder approaches
(Butsic, 1994) or other risk measures. As such, probabilistic methodologies are the most
complex of the four approaches to assessing regulatory capital charges in terms of
consistency, codification, and data requirements. Their complexity is also reflected in
large costs associated with their application (KMPG, 2002).
As to the operational risk, it has been assumed that this specific risk will be more
accurately captured under the AMA3 and, therefore, incentives in terms of a lower capital
charge granted to AMA applicant banks that refine and develop sound operational risk
methodologies (Fitch, 2004). However, due to the specificity of this major risk class,
there is no clear idea about the actual implications for using the AMA as a method to
assess operational risk capital charges and, importantly, how its implementation would
ultimately result in a lower capital charge for financial institutions that adopt it.
According to a survey carried out by Fitch in 2004, forty-two large banks around the
world believe that the AMA may generate capital charges that are not lower than those
under the standardized or basic indicator approaches (Fitch, 2004).
As of today, there is a small body of literature that focuses on how the AMA
should be effectively implemented in financial institutions. Literature on AMA can be

3

KMPG (2002) describes scenario-based model as a methodology that explores the impact of specific
risk variables to company specific exposure.
The two other approaches include the Basic Indicator Approach (BIA) set according to the fixed ratio
methodology and the Standardized Approach (TSA) established according to the risk-based capital
approach.
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traced only as far back as 2001 when the Committee published its document “Working
Paper on the Regulatory Treatment of Operational Risk” in September 2001. With regard
to the AMA-related academic literature, Embrechts et al. (2003), Chavez-Demoulin et al.
(2004b), Embrechts et al. (2004), and Neslehova et al. (2006) question the ability of the
standard actuarial model4 as well as extreme value theory5 to adequately address AMA
issues because the assumptions behind these models are barely in line with the actual
characteristics of operational risk losses. The authors consider models that include the
particular case of the Cramer-Lundberg model6, and general risk processes where the
underlying intensity model follows a finite state Markov chain, allowing the modeling of
underlying changes in the economy. In line with Embrechts et al., Chernobai and Rachev
(2004) advocate for the use of the compound Cox model7 or the alpha-stable distribution
model8 instead of the simple compound Poisson process9.
As it appears, nearly all of these models suggest approaches which are more
appropriate for large data sets without significant reporting bias. As a result, there is a
need for more formal empirical research about operational risk capital requirements,
taking into account various constraints in terms of data availability, data collection costs,
limited computational resources, and limited decision time.
On the practitioners’ side, Frachot et al. (2001), Frachot et al. (2002), and Baud
et al. (2002) describe the Loss Distribution Approach (LDA) for operational loss and
provide a methodology that allows banks to pool internal data with external data to

4
5
6
7
8
9

Klugman et al. (2004).
Embrects et al. (1997).
See Embrects et al. (1997).
See Cox et al. (1980).
Zolotarev (1994), Embrechts et al., (1997), Rachev, S. Mittnik, S. (2000), Nolan (2001).
See Rolski et al. (1998).
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estimate operational risk capital charge. Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) use the
aforementioned methodology to provide preliminary empirical evidence on how publicly
available operational loss data could be used to calibrate large loss severity probability
distribution functions and capital charges. In their model, the random truncation point
used to account for the reporting biases that plague this specific dataset is assumed to be
logistically distributed. This assumption highly impacts the underlying loss severity
distribution function and even though it is computationally convenient, it has been
criticized on the account that it is not grounded on empirical evidence (Leandri, 2003). In
addition, the dependency across risk categories is not accounted for. Di Clemente et al
(2003) develop a model that considers a dependence structure based on the Student’s tcopula and historical rank correlations. The empirical exercise, however, is carried out
using catastrophe insurance loss data of three different lines – namely, hurricane, windstorm, and flood. As such, the authors do not consider actual operational risk loss data
issues. The next subsection presents my main contributions and the structure of the
thesis.

1.2 Contributions and Organization of the Dissertation
My research objective is to investigate the implications of using the AMA to address
operational risk capital charge modeling issues with regard to Basel II and US
Regulations. More specifically, this dissertation examines the extent to which the four
key elements of the AMA10 could be incorporated into a model that has the potential to
capture the relationship between the adequacy of capital and the quality of risk
10

These elements include internal data, external data, scenario analysis, and business environment and
control factor.
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management (Caruana, 2003).

For the empirical exercise, my work extends the

methodology proposed in Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) that derives operational loss severity
probability distribution function for large losses as well as the required capital charges.
As mentioned in the preceding section, these authors use publicly available operational
losses to design a model based on Extreme Value Theory (EVT) and random truncation
point to estimate the loss severity probability distribution function that could be relevant
to internationally active banks. The above-cited model requires using a convolution of
distribution functions, and as such, is computationally intensive. In view of the foregoing
concern, my research produced an efficient symbolic computational paradigm that
facilitates the calibration of the parameters of the model. Within this symbolic
framework, I provide answers to a key issue that involves calibrating the parameters of
the loss severity to reflect specific firm size, rating, internal control environment as well
as market-related factors. Finally, my work lead to a methodology based on upper tail
dependence properties of elliptical copulas, and finite mixture distribution analysis to
determine the empirical probability distribution function of the overall capital charge by
means of Monte Carlo simulation runs. As a result, this latter paradigm also accounts for
the quality of firm internal control environment through the weight assigned to each type
of copula.
Using the wording of Fitch (2003), one may claim that the proposed approach
provides incentives in terms of a lower capital charge to AMA applicant banks and
insurance companies that refine and develop sound operational risk methodologies.
Indeed, this dissertation clearly reveals that operational risk losses are driven by two loss
event types - namely, Clients, Products and Businesses Practices on the one hand, and

6

Internal Fraud on the other hand. As a result, the quality of firm internal control
environment appears as a key factor that significantly impacts the loss severity
distribution and thereby the capital charge. Overall, my framework actually provides
preliminary answers to some major concerns raised by regulators, scholars and
practitioners as summarized in Fitch (2003). A crucial future consideration is to set up a
paradigm that could accurately quantify the quality of firm internal control environment
with regard to Pillar 2, Pillar 3, Sarbanes-Oxley Act11, and Risk-Focused Surveillance
Framework12.
The structure of the dissertation is as follows. After this general introduction that
explains why operational risk has become a major risk class, chapter 2 reviews the BCBS
literature relevant to the topic as well as the literature from scholars and practitioners.
Chapter 3 describes the model used to perform the simulation runs while chapter 4
presents the empirical procedure and the key results. Finally chapter 5 gives the
concluding remarks.
Chapter 2 begins by concisely exploring the rationale for banking and insurance
solvency regulation. Next, section 2.1 sketches out the evolution of the Basel Accord
from 1988 to 2004 and explains the rationale for the move from the Cooke ratio that
addresses credit risk capital issues toward the current McDonough ratio that addresses
market, credit and operational risk capital requirements. Subsequently, the regulatory
framework for the U.S. insurance undertaking is explored. Section 2.2 reviews the
literature devoted to the computational aspects of the AMA. Specifically, subsection
2.2.1 describes the three approaches set forth by BCBS to address AMA issues.

11
12

See Sarbanes-Oxley (2002).
See NAIC (2004).
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Subsection 2.2.2 examines the relevant literature that deals with operational risk
emerging practices and related issues from both practitioners and scholars.
Chapter 3 concentrates on the model used to determine the empirical probability
distribution function of the overall capital charge. Section 3.2 mathematically describes
the capital charge formulation under the BCBS requirements while section 3.3 is
dedicated to the Loss Distribution Approach. With regard to this latter model, the basic
framework –namely, the Cramer-Lundberger model is first described, and next the point
process methodology envisioned as a promising extension of the basic model is covered,
notably, the new results from Chavez-Demoulin et al. (2005) and Pfeifer and Neslehova
(2004). Subsection 3.3.2 focuses on the methodology proposed by Fontnouvelle et al.
(2003) to extract both the observed and underlying loss severities from the publicly
available operational loss data. Subsection 3.3.2.1 presents the above-cited approach, its
symbolic implementation is described in subsection 3.3.2.2, and finally an extension of
the model to account for specific firm size, rating, internal control environment as well as
market-related factors is set forth in subsection 3.3.2.3. Subsection 3.3.3 considers the
loss frequency distribution modeling. First, the calibration of this distribution is tackled
through a risk assessment exercise as mentioned in Fontnouvelle et al. (2003). Next a
basic common Poisson shock model suggested by Powojowski et al. (2002) and
mentioned in Chavez-Demoulin et al. (2005) is explored.
Subsection 3.3.4 discusses some dependence structure issues that are considered
when it comes to determine the overall capital charge. Indeed, within the BCBS
framework, banks are required to estimate the capital charge for each of the 56 business
line/event type and use a dependence structure model to aggregate these values. Since

8

copulas provide more significant information on dependence structure than the
conventional Pearson correlation, various families of copulas are examined with
particular emphasis on copulas of extreme dependence and elliptical copulas. Finally,
Subsection 3.3.5 uses upper tail dependence properties of elliptical copulas as well as
finite mixture distribution analysis to express the overall capital charge as a mixing
weighted capital charges.
Chapter 4 deals with the empirical investigation in the context of publicly
available operational losses. Section 4.2 highlights some key descriptive statistics and
motivates the risk classification schemes within which loss severities are calibrated and
capital charges determined. Section 4.3 discusses the calibration of the parameters of the
loss severity distribution using three distributional assumptions for the random truncation
point. Finally, section 4.4 presents the descriptive statistics as well as the histogram of the
empirical probability distribution function (that accounts for the randomness of the
Monte Carlo simulation runs) of the overall capital charge.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
As a starting point for the literature review, we will briefly explore the rationale for
banking and insurance solvency regulation and outline the development of the Agreed
Framework of the Committee as well as the U.S. Risk Based Capital framework.
Subsequently, diverse strands of the literature will be surveyed and discussed.

2.1 The Regulatory Framework
2.1.1 Rationale for Banking and Insurance Solvency Regulation
The three alternative views of bank supervision, as mentioned in Barth et al. (2003),
include the “helping hand” view, the “grabbing hand” vision (Becker and Stigler, 1974;
Shleifer and Vishny, 1998), and the “private monitoring” view (Haber, 2003).
Specifically, the helping hand view emphasizes market failures while the grabbing hand
view highlights political failures - politicians may take advantage of powerful
supervisory agencies to compel banks to lend to privileged borrowers. The “private
monitoring” view is a compromise that encompasses the “grabbing hand” view as well as
“the helping hand” (Barth et al., 2003). In the sequel, we elaborate on the “the helping
hand” vision which is commonly referred to as the public interest theory of regulation.

10

According to the public interest theory of regulation (see for example Stigler,
1971 and Posner, 1974), governments enforce regulation when free markets fail to
allocate resource efficiently. For financial institutions, externalities and government
guarantees13 have the potential to create market failure, and thereby provide a rationale
for government intervention. With regard to the banking industry, externalities in terms
of systemic risk are defined by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) as "the risk
that the failure of a participant to meet its contractual obligations may in turn cause other
participants to default with a chain reaction leading to broader financial difficulties".
Systemic events like bank runs14 can inflict significant social costs on the affected
economies, by disrupting inter-bank and foreign credit relations. As a result,
identification and close monitoring of systemic risks are higher priority on the policy
agenda of central bankers.
Government guarantees for bank deposits partly eliminate the rationale for bank
runs and protect small depositors who cannot effectively monitor their bank because of
the high costs involved. Early on, public policymakers, as well as scholars15, focused on
issues involved in this specific guarantee. Recent empirical studies revealed a strong and
robust link between the generosity of the deposit insurance system and bank fragility16.
Generous deposit insurance schemes lessen market discipline enforcement and
create a moral hazard issue, since there is a potential incentive for banks to engage in

13
14
15
16

Government guarantees include the deposit insurance for the banking industry and the guaranty fund for
the insurance industry.
By definition, bank runs is caused by depositors trying to withdraw their assets from the bank to avoid a
loss of capital (Dionne , 2003).
See for example Merton (1977).
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2003), Barth et al. (2003).
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higher-risk activities because the cost of the deposit insurance premium is not related to
their risk taking-activity17.
Thus, the rationale for controlling a bank’s risk-taking activities stems from an
asymmetric information issue, due to the existence of deposit insurance. Banking
supervisors accomplish this control by performing solvency assessments that require,
among other things, banks to carry minimum levels of capital that act as a cushion to
protect the insurance fund. In this regard, the 1988 Basle Accord framed under the
chairmanship of W.P. Cooke provided the first decisive step toward efficient banking
regulation for internationally active banks.
With regard to the U.S. banking industry, in 1989, the three banking agencies18
(the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC)) and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) adopted a common regulatory
framework that establishes minimum capital adequacy ratios for commercial banks, in
line with the 1988 Basle Accord.
As to the insurance industry, Cummins et al. (1995) mention that the rationale for
insurance solvency regulation includes the difficulty for the insured to really monitor the
insurer solvency due to the complexity of the insurance activity and the likelihood that
insurers could increase risk following policy issuance, particularly, if the interests of the
new policyholders and existing policyholders diverge. Also included is the existence of

17
18

See Cull et al. (2004), Barth et al. (2003).
At the federal level, the Federal Reserve has primary supervisory responsibility for state-chartered
banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System, as well as for all bank holding companies and
certain operations of foreign banking organizations. The FDIC has primary responsibility for state
nonmember banks and FDIC supervised savings banks. National banks are supervised by the OCC. The
OTS has primary responsibility for savings and loan associations (The Federal Reserve Board (1999)).
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non-risk-rated guaranty fund19 coverage that provides insurers with the possibility to
increase the value of owners’ equity by engaging in riskier activities without being
penalized by the market (Cummins, 1988).
Just as banks hold capital to protect the insurance fund, so do insurers carry
minimum levels of capital to protect the guaranty fund. However, as pointed out by
Medova et al. (2004), “an optimal balance must be struck between holding economic
capital to ensure solvency and its cost, in order to provide a decent return on equity for
shareholders”20.

2.1.2 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Framework: From the
Cooke Ratio to the McDonough Ratio
In July 1988, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision released its report
“International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards”. In many
regards, the paper that became known as the 1988 Basel Capital Accord was a milestone
(Caruana, 2003). Indeed, for the first time, the Group of Ten (G-10)21 banking
supervisory authorities set up an agreed framework for establishing minimum levels of
capital, in relation to credit risk, for internationally active banks. Essentially, the 1988
Accord aims at reinforcing the soundness and stability of the international banking
system and “diminishing an existing source of competitive inequality among international
banks” (BCBS, 1988). Typically, within this new framework, a weighted risk ratio
19
20
21

State guaranty funds require solvent insurers to pay losses of insolvent firms. Guaranty fund coverage
weakens the market incentive for insureds to monitor insurers’ solvency (Cummins et al., 1995).
See also Merton and Perold (1993), Froot and Stein (1998), Perold (2001).
The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision comprises representatives of the central banks and
supervisory authorities of the Group of Ten countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States) and Luxembourg. The Committee
meets at the Bank for International Settlements, Basle, Switzerland.
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known as the Cooke ratio or risk asset ratio (RAR), requires international banks to hold
capital at least equal to 8 percent of their reported risk-weighted assets.
The Committee set up the components of the regulatory capital in two equallyweighted tiers. These include tier 1 - the core capital, comprised of equity capital and
disclosed reserves, tier 2 - the supplementary capital, consisted of other elements of
capital such as undisclosed reserves, reevaluation reserves, general provisions and
general loss reserves, hybrid debt capital instruments and subordinated term debt.
With regard to the ratios that could appropriately assess bank capital adequacy,
the Committee expressed the view that the weighted risk ratio in which capital is tied to
different classes of asset and off-balance sheet exposure, weighted according to some risk
categories, was the best method for making such an assessment. Three facts underpinned
the Committee choice over a more regular gearing ratio methodology. Firstly, risk ratio
facilitates comparisons between heterogeneous international banking systems in that it
offers a more adequate basis for assessment. Secondly, this specific ratio permits offbalance-sheet exposures to be included more smoothly into the capital measurement
framework. Thirdly, the risk ratio does not prevent banks from holding assets deemed to
be low risk such as cash or claims on central governments and central banks. The
Committee kept as simple as possible the weighting structure by allowing only five
weights i.e. 0, 10, 20, 50 and 100 percent. The weighting structure for on-balance-sheet
assets items is set out in the Appendix 1, Table A1.
As to the level of the weighted risk ratio, in light of consultations and pilot testing
of the framework, the Committee agreed that the proposed ratio of capital to weighted
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risk assets should be set at 8 percent. International active banks in member countries had
been expected to achieve the target ratio by the end of 1992.
Regarding capital requirements for the U.S. banking and thrift agencies, CAS
(1992) mentions that, in 1986, US banking regulatory agencies issued a risk-based capital
proposal that had been criticized on the grounds that without a comparable framework for
foreign players, U.S. banks would suffer from a competitive disadvantage. In view of the
foregoing concerns, in 1987, the US banking regulatory agencies and the Bank of
England examined various issues involved in such approaches and set out a joint
proposal. Afterward, in 1988, the Basle Committee refined this proposal and expanded it
to incorporate the G-10 member countries. In the U.S., the FRB, the OCC, the OTS and
the FDIC implemented risk-based capital standards that were in line with the 1988 Basle
Capital Accord.
On many accounts, the 1988 Basel Capital Accord was a great success story
(Caruana, 2003). It has been adopted in over 100 countries and the Cooke ratio has come
to be recognized as a popular yardstick to quantify a bank’s capital adequacy. The
rationale for its success was perhaps its simplicity that arose from the fact that the G-10
governments as well as the financial communities were eager to release a straightforward
applicable framework that could revert the downward trend in international active bank
capitalization (Caruana, 2003). Indeed, during the mid-80’s, the capital of the world’s
major banks had become dangerously low after continual erosion through competition
(BCBS, 2001a). Another reason for its success might stem from the fact that the Accord
has been set out in the aftermath of serious disturbances in equity markets: on Monday,
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October 19, 1987 US Stock collapsed by 23 percent, wiping out US$ 1 trillion in capital
(Hong, 2003).
In the years since 1988, the weaknesses of the simple approach to capital
regulation have come to light. As a matter of fact, the 1988 Accord has suffered from
many criticisms, the most obvious being that it did not adequately address off-balance
sheet exposures on market risk in particular risks associated with the bank’s positions in
derivatives. In addition, it did not account for portfolio diversification effects, netting
effects and the borrower’s credit rating. Indeed, taking into account correlations between
risk categories of the portfolio may lower total portfolio risk while matching lenders and
borrowers may decrease bank’s net exposure (Jorion, 1997). Another shortcoming of the
1988 Accord was that it tended to support transactions and investments whose sole
benefits were regulatory arbitrage. Investments in costly but better risk management
without tangible regulatory capital relief were not fully realized. CAS (1992) mentions
that studies in the Wall Street Journal indicate that the new capital requirement, soon
after its implementation in the U.S., triggered many banks to change their investment
policies by moving assets out of corporate loans (which carry the maximum 100 percent
risk weight) into government securities (which require 0 percent risk weight). As a result,
the market witnessed a decrease in bank lending and the FRB discussed the possibility of
facilitating some of the capital requirements. In this regard, under the risk-based capital
guidelines, the FRB may modify the rules in order to reflect significant changes in the
economy, financial markets, banking practices, etc.
Over the past decade, the state-of-the-art in measuring and managing risk has
made tremendous progress in ways the builders of the 1988 Accord could not have
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foreseen (Caruana, 2004). The explosive growth in the markets for credit derivatives and
for securitized assets and liabilities has provided banks with new ways to manage and
transfer credit risk. Advances in technology and telecommunications have changed the
way that banks process data on their exposures. In response to these aforementioned
criticisms and challenging innovations, the Committee issued a series of amendments to
provide banks and their supervisors with sound measures of the actual risks they face.
In the quest for addressing risks other than credit risk, in January 1996, the
Committee issued its paper “Amendment to the Capital Accord to incorporate Market
Risks”. Through this amendment, the Committee set up capital requirements for market
risks arising from banks' open positions in foreign exchange, traded debt securities,
equities, commodities and options. Two alternative approaches to the measurement of
this specific risk have been proposed, namely the standardized method and the internal
models approach. The capital charge under the standardized measurement method has
been set out as an arithmetic sum of specific measures of the five risk categories
addressed by the Committee.
Through internal models that reflected practices in leading financial institutions,
the Committee has allowed banks to use their own qualified risk assessment models to
determine their capital charge. In many regards, this approach has been a groundbreaking step forward in banking regulation.
Using a models-based methodology requires banks to satisfy minimum qualitative
and quantitative standards. Qualitative standards include, among other things, the design
and implementation of the bank's risk management system by an independent risk control
unit, as well as a periodic independent review of the risk measurement system. The
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minimum quantitative standards involve, among other things, the computation of valueat-risk (VaR) as a risk metric, to quantify bank's exposure according to the following:
•

Value-at-risk are computed with a holding period of 10 trading days or
two calendar weeks, at the 99th percentile, with an historical observation
period constrained to a minimum length of one year.

•

Empirical correlations within risk categories as well as across risk
categories may be recognized.

•

Each bank has to meet, on a daily basis, a capital requirement expressed
as the maximum between its previous day's value-at-risk and an average
of the daily value-at-risk measures on each of the preceding sixty
business days, multiplied by a factor. The multiplication factor (set to a
minimum value of 3) has to be determined by the supervisor and
adjusted according to back-testing results.

The rationale of this practice is to give incentives to banks to improve the predictive
accuracy of their model.
In addition to the above minimum qualitative and quantitative standards, the
Committee set out three other requirements for the use of internal models. These were:
•

The selection of a suitable set of market risk factors, that is the market
prices and rates that impact the value of the bank's on-and off-balancesheet trading positions.

•

The use of stress testing scenarios as stress testing to capture events that
could significantly impact banks is a major exercise in assessing bank's
capital position.
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•

An external validation of models' accuracy by external auditors and/or
supervisory authorities.

To calculate the total capital-adequacy requirements, the credit-risk charge is
added to the market-risk charge. The eligible capital to cover market risks includes tier 1
capital and tier 2 capital as defined in the 1988 Accord. Also included (at the discretion
of the national authority) is tier 3 capital consisting of short-term subordinated debt. Tier
3 capital is restricted to approximately 70 percent of an institution’s measure for market
risk.
In a quest to push further forward its responsiveness to financial innovation and
developments in risk management practices, the Committee released in July 1999 its
consultative paper “A New Capital Adequacy Framework”. According to William J.
McDonough, previous chairman of the Basel Committee, the key objective of the New
Accord is to strengthen the stability of the global financial system. To achieve this
objective, the New Basel Accord implements goals that consist, among other things, of
“capturing the relationship between the adequacy of capital and the quality of risk
management by relying on three mutually reinforcing pillars” (Caruana, 2003). These
include, minimum capital requirements, supervisory review, and market discipline. In the
sequel, we review the position of Jaime Caruana (the current chairman of the Basel
Committee) on the objective of the three pillars.
Essentially, the first pillar aims at matching capital requirements more closely
with actual risks banks incur. For instance, the Advanced Measurement Approaches to
operational risk build on the bank’s internal loss data and allows banks to rely on their
own assessments of risk to calculate how much capital to hold. As a result, economic
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incentives in terms of lower capital charges are granted to banks that appropriately assess
their exposures and develop better techniques for managing their risks. In addition to
performing that match, pillar 1 seeks to achieve convergence between economic capital
and regulatory capital.
Through the second pillar, supervisors will be accountable for evaluating the
internal processes banks employ to determine their need for capital. By engaging
managers in a discussion about the risks they incur and the controls they have adopted to
address them, supervisors create incentives for managers to act prudently.
The third pillar uses the market itself to provide discipline to banks to make sure
that they are not holding low levels of capital. This is achieved by making the banks’
public reporting of their risks as well as measures taken to control such risks, available to
investors and customers. This generates a strong incentive for bank management to
enhance their handling of those risks.
As a result, these three pillars, taken together, aim at providing incentives to
banks to get a more accurate recognition of the risks they incur and take preemptive
actions to protect themselves against those risks by means of their control structures and
their holdings of capital (Caruana 2003). To make certain that the risks within an entire
banking group are considered, the New Accord is extended on a consolidated basis to
holding companies of banking groups.
After pilot testing of the proposed new Framework and large consultations with
the financial community worldwide, the Committee issued on June 26, 2004, its final
report “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A
Revised Framework”. The Central Bank Governors as well as the Heads of Banking
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Supervision of the G-10 countries have endorsed the Framework and the Standard it
contains.
Under the Agreed Framework (also referred to as Revised Framework or Basel
II), Pillar 1, covers regulatory capital requirements for market, credit and operational risk.
Three key elements characterize the minimum capital. These are, the definition of
regulatory capital, the risk weighted assets and the minimum ratio of capital to risk
weighted assets. With regard to the definition of the eligible regulatory capital, it remains
the same as the one set out in the 1988 Accord, and refined in the 27 October 1998 press
release on instruments eligible for inclusion in Tier 1 capital. The total risk weighted
assets is calculated by multiplying the capital requirements for market risk and
operational risk by 12.5 (i.e. the reciprocal of the minimum capital ratio of 8 percent) and
adding the resulting figures to the sum of risk-weighted assets calculated for credit risk.
The capital ratio (also referred to as the McDonough ratio) is simply the ratio of the
regulatory capital to the total risk weighted assets. The ratio must be no lower than 8
percent for total capital. Tier 2 capital will continue to be limited to 100 percent of Tier 1
capital. Tier 3 capital remains restricted to approximately 70 percent of an institution’s
measure for market risk.
To enhance risk sensitivity, the Committee offers a variety of options for
addressing both credit and operational risk. As to credit risk, the range of options includes
the standardized approach, a foundation internal ratings-based approach (IRB), and an
advanced IRB approach. Regarding operational risk minimum capital requirements, the
Committee recommends several approaches that reflect those of credit and market risk.
These include three methods in the continuum of increasing sophistication and risk
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sensitivity (BCBS, 2001): the Basic Indicator Approach (BIA), the Standardized
Approach (TSA) and the Advanced Measurement Approaches (AMA).
Banks adopting the Basic Indicator Approach are required to hold capital for
operational risk that amounts to the average over the previous three years of a fixed
percentage (termed alpha) of positive annual gross income. The level of the parameter
alpha has been set to 15 percent following the Quantitative Impact Survey (QIS) data
analysis. Gross income is defined as net interest income plus net non-interest income.
The Committee has not set any special requirement for use of the Basic Indicator.
The Standardized Approach is based on a three-stage calculation. The starting
point consists of allocating the bank’s previous three-year gross income into eight
standard business lines. Then, for each business line, operational risk capital requirement
is calculated as in the BIA case but with the business line specific factor (beta factor).
The computation ends with calculating the total operational risk capital requirement as
the sum of the individual business line operational risk capital requirements. The business
lines with their respective beta factors are reported in Appendix 1 Table A2.
If a bank is primarily active in Retail or Commercial Banking business lines, the
Committee authorizes the use of the Alternative Standardized Approach (ASA) instead of
the TSA. For these two specific business lines, the relevant exposure indicator is the
three-year average of the total nominal amount of loans and advances for each business
line multiplied by 0.035.
The qualifying criteria for the use of the Standardized Approach as well as the
Alternative Standardized Approach include, among other things, the involvement of the
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board of directors and senior management in the oversight of the operational risk
management process.
As to the AMA, the operational risk regulatory capital requirement under this
approach is drawn from the bank’s own internal operational risk measurement system.
The use of the AMA is subject to regulatory approval and some specific qualitative and
quantitative standards need to be met.
Qualitative standards essentially require that an AMA applicant bank must
integrate its internal operational risk measurement framework into its day-to-day risk
management systems (FSA, 2005), and create an independent risk management function
for operational risk.
Quantitative standards involve the following: first, banks can base the minimum
regulatory capital requirement on unexpected losses alone if they succeed in
demonstrating to the satisfaction of the national supervisor that their expected loss
exposure is measured and accounted for; second, the operational risk measure should
meet a soundness standard comparable to the IRB approach for Credit Risk, that is, oneyear holding period and 99.9 percent confidence; third, operational risk measurement
must include four key elements - namely, internal data, external data, scenario analysis
and business environment and control factors.
The Committee envisions internal data as essential for relating risk estimates to
loss experience. This is carried out by using internal loss as the basis of empirical risk
estimates.
A bank's internal loss collection processes must meet sound standards in order to
qualify for regulatory capital purposes. These include the mapping of its historical
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internal loss data into the supervisory categories of business lines and loss event types,
the design of a comprehensive dataset accounting for different types of exposures, and
geographic locations. Also included are the choice of an appropriate threshold, dates of
events, any recoveries of gross loss amounts, as well as descriptive information about
drivers or causes of loss events. Banks must design specific criteria for allocating loss
data stemming from events or activities that extend over many business lines, as well as
from related events over time.
The Committee requires AMA applicants to use a minimum five-year observation
period of internal loss data to generate risk measures for regulatory capital purposes. A
three-year historical data window is sufficient for the first application of the AMA.
To address internal loss data intrinsic weaknesses such as data gaps and
backwards-looking measure of exposure, the Committee requires the use of external data,
scenario analysis, business environment, and internal control factors.
Concerning external data, the Committee recommends the use of relevant external
data to supplement internal data, each time an AMA applicant bank is exposed to
infrequent, yet potentially severe losses. Requirements for the use of external data include
information on the scale of business operations where the event occurred, information on
the causes and circumstances of the loss events as well as information that would help in
assessing the significance of the loss event for other banks.
The conditions and practices for external data use, notably the pooling
methodologies must be well-documented and subject to periodic independent review.
The Committee requires an AMA applicant bank to employ scenario analysis of
expert opinion associated with external data to evaluate the bank’s exposure to high
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severity events. Typically, scenario analysis uses the knowledge of experienced business
managers and risk management experts to derive consistent assessments of plausible
severe losses. Examples of uses of this methodology include assessment of potential
losses occurring from simultaneous operational risk loss events as well as assignment of
values to parameters of assumed statistical loss distributions. A specificity of this
approach is that banks need to constantly ensure the accuracy of assessments with respect
to actual loss experience.
The Committee requires banks to include into their risk assessment methodology
key business environment and internal control factors that have an impact on their
operational risk profile. Control factors strengthen bank’s risk assessments in many ways.
Besides being more forward-looking, they make capital assessments reflect risk
management objectives, and above all, they account for enhancements and declines in
operational risk profiles quickly. The use of these factors in a bank’s risk measurement
framework is subject to some standards. First, banks have to motivate the choice of each
factor as a significant driver of risk. Second, the link between bank’s risk estimates and
factors and the relative weighting of the various factors should be well conceptualized.
Third, over time, banks need to contrast the assessment estimates with actual internal loss
experience, external data, and make suitable amendments.
Internally determined correlations and dependencies in operational risk losses are
recognized for the use of the AMA. With regard to risk mitigation issues, AMA applicant
banks will be allowed to take into account the risk mitigating impact of insurance in
operational risk measurement up to 20 percent of the total operational risk capital charge
calculated under the AMA.
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With regard to U.S. banking regulations, recent legislation that aims to infuse a
great deal of discipline within the banking system and financial markets include (1) the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA), (2) the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA), and (3) the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (SOX)22. Now, we review the capital requirement literature in connection with the
U.S. insurance industry.

2.1.3 Regulatory Capital Framework for the U.S. Insurance Undertakings
In the United States, state insurance regulators came together in 1871 to create the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners to address the need to coordinate
regulation of multistate insurers (NAIC, 2005). In many regards23, the development of
insurance risk-based capital (RBC) requirements stemmed from the report "Failed
Promises: Insurance Company Insolvencies" issued in February, 1990, by the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the U.S. House Committee on Energy
and Commerce - the Dingell Committee (U.S. House of Representatives, 1990).
Essentially, this Committee investigated U.S. insurer insolvencies during the mid-1980 as
well as various deficiencies in the existing solvency regulatory system. Reflecting the
Dingell Committee‘s work and proposals, in December 1992, the NAIC adopted a lifehealth insurer risk-based capital framework and model law that entered into force with
the 1993 annual statement filed in March 1994. Similarly, a property-liability insurer

22

23

FDICIA was passed in the wake of the Savings & Loan disastrous decline, SOX was enacted in reaction
to pervasive corporate malfeasance, such as events at Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom. GLBA was written
to modernize financial regulation and also to fight personal identity theft (BITS Operational Risk
Management Working Group, 2005).
See Cummins et al. (1995), Insurance Information Institute (2005)
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risk-based capital and model law adopted by the NAIC in December 1993 entered into
force with the 1994 annual statement filed in March 1995.
Lewis (1998) recognizes that RBC rules help supervisors in taking prompt
regulatory steps against insurers without court action. Cummins et al. (1995) question
risk-based capital requirements on the grounds that insolvency risk is hard to quantify in
that it encompasses various non-tangible factors that are difficult to assess. In addition,
the insurance market is characterized by many different players in terms of company size
and organizational form, types of business written and customer specificities. As a result,
it is inappropriate to specify the correct amount of capital for most insurers through a
formula. Cummins et al. (1995) carry out an empirical exercise, investigating the
relationship between the industry insolvency experience and the ratio of actual capital to
RBC for property-liability insurers from 1989 through 1991. Results indicate that more
than half of the companies that later failed had RBC ratios outside the mandated ranges
for regulatory and company action. In addition, RBC models usually fail in predicting
large firm insolvencies so that accounting for firm size and organizational form improves
the predictive accuracy of the insolvency risk models.
SOA (2002) admits that certain risks such as liquidity risk, operational risk, and
the risk of fraud are difficult to assess through a RBC formula, and as a result, are mostly
not accounted for in the formula. Brender (2004) assimilates business risk to operational
risk for life insurers and points out that “this is the area most in need of future
development in considering insurance required capital. The emphasis will be different
from that in banking, since the insurance business is not as transaction based as is
banking.”
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In terms of operational risk quantification, for the whole insurance industry,
business risk approximately accounts for 13 percent of the total regulatory capital
(Rochette, 2005). In the UK, a recent illustrative case developed in GIRO Working Party
(2004) reveals that operational risk capital charge could approximately amount to 2
percent of net premiums on average. However, the authors recognize that further work is
needed to quantify the real impact of operational risk.
As of today, the trend in the management and measurement of the operational risk
within the insurance industry is toward a Basel-based framework. In this regard, the U.S.
regulating authorities are currently reshaping their methodology for a more efficient
insurance solvency regulation. In that sense, the new Framework, in tune with Basel II,
offers a more robust methodology to supervise and assess the solvency of insurers on an
ongoing basis. Part of the Framework's focus is on the Risk Assessment Matrix “intended
to be an all-encompassing tool incorporating risk assessment, examination procedures
and results” (NAIC, 2004). Nine types of risk classes including operational risk24 are
determined and input in phase two of the Risk Assessment Matrix. Now we are in a
position to review the relevant literature that discusses the computational aspects of the
AMA.

2.2 The Computational Aspects of the AMA
The literature on the AMA started in 2001 when the Committee published its document
in September 2001 “Working Paper on the Regulatory Treatment of Operational Risk”.
24

NAIC (2004)’s definition of operational risk. “Operational problems such as inadequate information
systems, breaches in internal controls, fraud, or unforeseen catastrophes will result in a disruption in
business and financial loss.”
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In fact, a range of operational risk internal approaches initiated by practitioners emerged
since 1998 when the Committee issued its report “Operational Risk Management”. This
report presented the outcome of a working group of thirty major banks from the member
countries on the management of operational risk. Reflecting these developments, the
Committee adopted the concept of the AMA through which a bank’s internal mechanism
for quantifying operational risk may be accepted by the supervisor, subject to a number
of requirements.
As of today, there are three strands in the AMA literature. The first strand is
provided by the Basel Committee itself. The second strand arises from academia (see for
example Embrechts et al., 2003; Neslehova et al., 2006) and the third strand stems from
practitioners in the banking industry (see for example Frachot et al., 2001; Shi et al.,
2000; Fontnouvelle et al. 2003). These three strands will be examined in the sequel.

2.2.1 BCBS Literature
In September 2001, the Basel Committee set out three approaches to addressing AMA
issues (BCBS, 2001c). These include Internal Measurement Approaches (IMA), Loss
Distribution Approaches (LDA), and Scorecard Approaches (SA). Now, we review the
literature with regard to these approaches.
Internal Measurement Approaches are based on a two-stage calculation process.
First, banks derive expected and unexpected losses from estimates of loss frequency and
severity for various business line/event type combinations, based on internal and external
loss data. Second, operational risk capital is computed by business line/event type as a
product of expected losses and factor (referred as to gamma factor) defined by banks but
subject to regulatory approval. This methodology assumes a fixed and stable relationship
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between expected losses (the mean of the loss distribution) and unexpected losses (the
tail of the loss distribution). A non-linear relationship can also be assumed. The total
capital charge is then calculated as the sum of the capital charge for individual business
line/event type cell.
Loss Distribution Approaches involve a four-step calculation.
•

For each business line/risk type cell, AMA applicant banks estimate the
shape of the distributions of the severity of individual events. This is
obtained either by imposing specific distributional assumptions as
lognormal or by using empirical methods as bootstrap and Monte Carlo
simulation.

•

The distribution of the number of losses for one-year horizon is derived
for each business line/risk type cell in order to compute the aggregate
loss and its distribution for the considered period.

•

The capital charges (for each individual business line/event type)
resulting from the aggregate loss distribution is computed based on a
high percentile of the loss distribution.

•

The overall capital charge is computed by assuming either perfect
positive correlation of losses across these cells, or by using other
aggregation methods that recognize the risk-reducing impact of lessthan-full correlation. In the former case, the total capital charge is
calculated as the sum of the capital charges for individual business
line/event type cell.
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Loss Distribution Approaches differ from Internal Measurement Approaches in
that they use disaggregated data and tend to assess unexpected losses directly rather than
via an assumption about the relationship between expected loss and unexpected loss on
aggregated data basis. As of today, several kinds of Loss Distribution Approach methods
are being developed and no industry standard has yet emerged.
The Scorecard Approaches can be conceptualized in two stages. First, banks have
to determine an initial level of operational risk capital at the firm or business line level.
Second, this initial level is modified over time by use of scorecards to reflect the
underlying risk profile and risk control environment of the different business lines.
Typically, scorecards bring, on a qualitative basis, a forward-looking dimension to the
capital calculations, by reflecting improvements in the risk control environment that will
decrease both the frequency and severity of future operational risk losses.
In terms of methodology, Scorecard Approaches may be rooted in initial
estimation methods that are identical to those used in Internal Measurement or Loss
Distribution Approaches. In some cases, it can be based on identification of a number of
indicators used as proxies for particular risk types within business units/lines. Whatever
methodology is selected, emphasis on a robust quantitative basis is needed in order to get
the Scorecard Approaches qualified for the AMA. In addition, the overall size of the
capital charge has to be based on an accurate analysis of internal and external loss data.
AMA is still evolving in the banking industry. Prior to implementation of the
Revised Framework by the end of 2007, the Committee will review leading industry
practices regarding credible and consistent estimates of potential operational losses as
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well as the level of capital requirements estimated by the AMA. We now turn to the
survey of the practitioner and academic literature on the AMA.

2.2.2 Practitioner and Academic Literature
As a starting point for reviewing these strands, we will explore emerging practices in
operational risk measurement as set out by practitioners from leading banks as discussed
in the Industry Technical Working Group –ITWG (2003). Subsequently, we will examine
academics' claims regarding these practices. Next, following Frachot et al. (2003) who
discuss these methodologies in five steps, the literature review will survey various
approaches related to each of these steps. These approaches include loss severity
estimation, loss frequency estimation, capital charge computations, confidence interval,
and scenario analysis. Finally in line with Cruz (2002), the operational risk back-testing
analysis will be explored.
2.2.2.1 Emerging Practices and Related Issues
Relevant literature on operational risk emerging practices includes Frachot et al. (2001),
Baud et al. (2002), Frachot et al. (2003), ITWG (2003), Embrechts et al. (2003), ChavezDemoulin et al. (2004b), Embrechts et al. (2004), Chavez-Demoulin et al. (2005), and
Neslehova et al. (2006). Essentially, the academic literature investigates the prerequisites
under which practitioners emerging practices hold.
As mentioned earlier, the AMA consists of three approaches – namely, IMA,
LDA, and SA. IMA is generally not considered in the literature. As to the SA, Currie
(2004) points out that there is no conclusive evidence that this model is actually
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functional and has predictive properties. Holmes (2003) questions its ability to provide
reliable information about bank risk over time. Concerning the LDA, ITWG (2003)
provides some insights into the way leading banks envision its implementation. ITWG
was created in 2000 by operational risk practitioners from leading financial institutions
around the world25. ITWG’s key objective is to develop and share practical new ideas for
the quantification of operational risk. Its agreed core approach for operational risk
measurement is essentially based on the actuarial modeling of operational risk losses,
notably the LDA. The Bayesian method and the causal modeling are considered as well.
Specifically, ITWG assumes that operational risk loss data is the most significant
risk indicator currently available that reflects the specific operational risk profile of each
bank.

A well-managed bank, because of its effective operational risk management

processes and tools, will be less exposed to operational risk losses- both expected and
unexpected. On the other hand, a bank without a robust operational risk management
control is likely to experience higher losses. As a result, loss data should be used as initial
input for implementing loss distribution, which will, in turn, be the underlying driver of
the AMA. ITWG also considers that its basic assumption still allows banks to employ
various components of the AMA with specific weights when assessing the overall AMA.
For instance, emphasis could be put on scenario analysis and business environment and
control factors in the risk assessment of business lines with a heavy-tailed loss
distribution and a small number of observed losses. Furthermore, the weight attached to
each element within the overall AMA will be adjusted over time as banks collect more
reliable data and expand their knowledge in operational risk management.
25

These are: ABN AMRO, Banca Intesa, BNP Paribas, BMO Financial Group, Crédit Lyonnais,
Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, ING, JP Morgan Chase, RBC Financial Group, Royal Bank of Scotland, San
Paolo IMI and Sumitomo Mitsui BC.
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Embrechts et al. (2003) question the ability of LDA to address adequately
operational risk loss modeling issues by analyzing the impact of LDA on operational risk
loss classified in two categories - namely, repetitive and stationary, non repetitive and
non- stationary. First, they discuss a series of prerequisites under which standard actuarial
methods supplemented with extreme value theory are appropriate for banks when dealing
with capital charge issues, in the context of operational risk. For standard actuarial
methods, these preconditions include independently and identically distributed (iid)
random variables assumptions (which implies data stationarity26), and repetitiveness of
observations. For the standard extreme value theory, notably the Peak-Over-Threshold
approach (POT)27, these requirements encompass, among other things, the abundance of
data over high thresholds, the number of exceedances as a homogeneous Poisson
process28. Embrechts et al. (2003) point out typical features displayed by operational risk
losses, notably the data paucity for certain loss event types, irregularities in the
occurrence times, and the existence of extremes. In addition, certain risks generate nonrepetitive losses (Crouhy et al., 2000). The authors contend that the observed
irregularities generally appear to go beyond ordinary randomness similar to that of a
homogeneous Poisson process. As to the non-stationarity, the authors argue that it might
stem from a sample selection bias like survivorship bias in that the discipline of
collecting operational risk losses in financial institutions is quite recent. As such, many
historical losses have not been kept in banks’ datasets. Alternatively, non-stationarity can
originate from business cycles, economic cycles, management interactions and
regulation.
26
27
28

See Rolski et al. (1998)
See Embrechts et al. (1997) ; McNeil and Siladin, (1997)
See Rolski et al. (1998)
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Reflecting these non repetitiveness and serial dependence, Embrechts et al. (2003)
argue that banks need to carry out initial clarifying analysis to find out which business
line/loss event types are sure candidates for actuarial techniques and POT methods as
well. They point out that actuarial methods and their enhancements can be used for
repetitive and stationary losses to assess capital charges. In contrast, for non-repetitive
and non-stationary losses that significantly endanger the existence of banks, Basel’s pillar
1 is inefficient so that pillar 2 and 3 should be considered and enforced.
Moving forward the theoretical framework of operational risk measurement,
Chavez-Demoulin and Embrechts (2004b) discuss some of the more recent extreme-value
theory approach that may be effective in modeling certain types of operational risk loss
data. The authors describe an adapted extreme-value method that accounts for nonstationarity (time dependence) and covariates (different types of losses). However, as of
today, the model is not fully applicable due to lack of large datasets.
More specifically, Chavez-Demoulin and Embrechts (2004b) extend the POT
method by allowing the three parameters of the distribution -namely, the Poisson
parameter and the Generalized Pareto Distribution (GPD) parameters (the shape and the
scale parameters) to be dependent on time and explanatory variables so as to account for
the non-stationatity. Following the non-parametric approach in Chavez-Demoulin and
Embrechts (2004a), they fit different models for the three parameters allowing for
functional dependence on time and on type of loss data (three types). A discontinuity
parameter that models the regime switching effect is added as well. Through the model,
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two risk measures, the Value-at-Risk and the Expected-Shortfall29 (ES) both dependent
on time and covariates are estimated. For illustration purpose, 99%VaR and 99% ES for
year 2002 are computed.
The results indicate that the model reasonably estimates the POT parameters. As
for the risk measures, the authors find out that the risk measures of loss type 3 is
significantly smaller than those of loss type 1 and 2. This result highlights the importance
of using all the provided information about the data by including loss types as covariates
instead of mixing data and getting a unique risk measure. However due to lack of large
historical data, the authors cannot ensure, through back-testing, that the methodology
correctly estimates the risk measures.
The next chapter examines the marked point process methodology sets forth in
Chavez-Demoulin et al. (2005) and Pfeifer and Neslehova (2004) to model the
dependence structure across risk categories in terms of aggregate losses.
2.2.2.2 Loss Severity Modeling
The related literature dealing with estimating operational risk loss severity distribution,
especially in the tail, comprises different convergent approaches. Each paper offers a
discussion of various biases that afflict external loss data - most notably the data
scalability and paucity, the reporting bias - and provides a methodology to circumvent
these isssues. Significant contributions include Frachot and Roncalli (2002), Baud et al.
(2002), Frachot et al. (2003), Baud et al. (2003), Fontnouvelle et al. (2003), Fontnouvelle
et al. (2004), Moscadelli (2004).

29

ES at a specified level α was introduced in both Acerbi et al. (2001) and Rockafellar and Uryasev (2001).
It is defined by the former authors as “the average loss in the worst 100 α % cases.
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Frachot et al. (2003) consider that operational risk loss data used to derive
severity distribution come from diverse sources that include business units within a bank
and external providers. As a result, prior to assessing loss severity distribution
calibration, one should reasonably address various issues raised by the mixture of such
apparently disparate data sources. To that aim, the authors set out two hypotheses
concerning the nature of data sources and develop arguments in favor of the one that
could lead to pragmatic and acceptable results, given the current resources devoted to
operational risk.
Hypothesis 1: The diverse sources of data are assumed to be homogeneous in the
sense that they originate from the same primary probability distribution even though each
source reports loss data according to its specific threshold.
Hypothesis 2: The diverse sources of data are presumed to be heterogeneous in
the sense that they derive from different probability distributions and as such, they need
to be re-scaled. Furthermore, each source may provide loss data in line with its particular
threshold.
As a matter of fact, Frachot et al. (2003) recognize that hypothesis 2 is not only
the broadest but also the most accurate. But what are the actual cost and benefit tradeoffs
associated with using alternative modes of accounting for data-pooling issues? Given the
current state of knowledge of the operational risk community on this topic and given the
resources dedicated to that class of risk, the authors advocate that hypothesis 2 is
extremely complicated to be adequately addressed. They argue that the scaling formula
attempts to derive a mathematical expression that links the internal severity distribution
to the external one (See Shih et al., 2000). Furthermore, under hypothesis 2, the scaling
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formula involves large sets of data drawn from various internal and external sources and
it is not even guaranteed that this scaling adjustment is practicable for all loss event types.
In the near-future, as soon as loss datasets become larger, further inspection may lead to
more insights into the issue. Therefore, as of today, it is untimely to think of the
derivation of consistent scaling functions. Frachot et al. (2003) also maintain that under
hypothesis 2, specific scaling formulas need to be estimated to account for differences
between business lines within a bank. This practice would require a large amount of work
to be carried out. Finally, the authors cite the empirical work performed by Fontnouelle et
al. (2003) in which severity distributions are derived from two different external loss
datasets. The results indicate that both datasets display great similarities once the
reporting bias has been properly accounted for.
In the same spirit as Frachot et al. (2003), Baud et al. (2003) mention that the
discipline of collecting and recording operational risk loss data within financial
institutions has been set out only lately. As a result, banks do not have access to sufficient
and adequate data. To mitigate the paucity of data issues, internal loss data must be
supplemented by external data from public and/or pooled industry databases (Baud et al.,
2002). This practice, however, pose some challenging problems. As pointed out by the
authors, the data generating processes that underlie the data collection exercise exhibit
some specific features that challenge the estimation of the loss severity distribution. In
effect, all loss data are subject to a truncation process by which data are recorded only
when individual losses exceed some threshold. Baud et al. (2003) argue that mandatory
thresholds either related to internal loss or set for industry-pooled data cannot always be
made enforceable within entities that collect data. As for public databases, Baud et al.
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(2003) point out that they generally comprise of large losses that are released and
recorded in an informal way without any specific threshold. In light of the
aforementioned facts, they conclude that for all types of datasets, stated thresholds should
be regarded as unknown parameters which need to be assessed as well. For industrypooled data, the threshold (also referred to as truncation point) should be treated as a
finite, discrete random variable while, for public datasets, it should be modeled as a
continuous random variable. In addition, effective thresholds used to report losses, will
tend to exceed stated thresholds so that industry-pooled and especially public data are
highly likely to be biased toward extreme losses leading to over-estimated capital
charges. Reflecting these conclusions, Baud et al. (2003) consider that the discipline of
using data in the context of operational risk losses should be in a way that the main
source of data heterogeneity should be accounted for through modeling the threshold
distribution along with the severity distribution. Furthermore, internal data must be
employed for estimating the main body of the severity distribution, (expected losses)
whereas external data should be used to assess the tail of the distribution (unexpected
losses).
Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) provide preliminary empirical evidence on how
publicly available databases could be used to assess operational risk capital charges for
internationally active banks. Essentially, the authors use the theoretical framework
suggested by Baud et al. (2002) and extreme value theory to derive both the sample (or
observed) loss severity and the true (or underlying) loss severity distribution functions for
publicly available operational risk losses. Assuming that these categories of losses are
representative of the risks to which internationally active banks are actually exposed to,
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the authors compute various capital charges depending on different levels of control
environments, sizes and business line's riskiness of banks. The tests performed to validate
the aforementioned assumption reveal that there is no evidence of any significant time
trend in the tail of the loss severity distribution and most importantly, there is “no
statistically significant relationship between the size of a bank and the value of the tail
thickness” (see also Shih et al., 2000). However, the authors argue that the tail of the
severity distribution at a specific bank could reflect the quality of its control environment.
The results from the study indicate that the log-logit-exponential distribution function
accounts for the reporting bias appropriately and therefore provides a good estimate for
the sample and the true loss severity distribution function, which in turn substantially
reduces the required capital charge. The results also reveal that the sample loss severity
distribution varies by business line. However, the authors cannot conclude whether the
underlying loss distribution actually varies across business lines. On this account, capital
charges have been computed as if the underlying loss severity distribution, in the context
of large operational risk losses, did not vary across business lines.
Specifically, Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) use data provided by two vendors of
publicly available operational loss data, OpRisk Analytics and OpVantage. A preliminary
analysis based on descriptive statistics reveals a difference in terms of data collection
processes and underlying loss distributions between U.S. losses and non-U.S. losses. In
addition, more than 66 percent of the reported losses occur in U.S. As a result, the authors
focus only on U.S. losses in the estimation of the loss severity and the capital charge.
The true loss severity distribution is derived, based on authors’ assumptions and
results from EVT:
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•

Assumption 1: The threshold beyond which nominal losses are reported
can be considered as sufficiently high to apply EVT results.

•

Assumption 2: Operational risk loss distributions belong either to the
maximum domain of attraction of the Frechet distribution or to that of
the Gumbel distribution so that conditional excesses loss distributions
can be approximated by the GPD (Pickands et al. 1974).

•

The maximum domain of attraction of the Frechet distribution can be
embedded into that of the Gumbel distribution30.

•

The maximum domain of attraction of the Gumbel distribution is closed
under logarithm transformations31 .

From these results, Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) conclude that the conditional excess
distribution of the logarithm of large operational risk losses can be approximated by the
GPD distribution with shape parameter equal to 0 (that is, the exponential distribution).
Both the normal and the logistic distribution functions are investigated to model the
distribution of the logarithm of the random truncation point. Fontnouvelle et al. (2003)
argue that capturing an operational loss in public disclosures depends on many random
factors. These are, among other things, the location of the bank, “personal idiosyncrasies
of the executives and other individuals involved in the disclosure decisions”. As a result,
according to the authors, a central limit reasoning suggests that the logarithm of the
random threshold should be normally distributed. However, this specific distribution
raises computational issues in terms of non convergence of the maximum likelihood
optimization function. The logistic distribution, on the other hand, provides a convenient
30
31

Embrechts et al. (1997) Examples 3.3.33 Page 148
Embrechts et al. (1997) Examples 3.3.34 Page 148
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framework to estimate the values of the parameters of the sample loss severity
distribution which turns out to be log-logit-exponential distribution function. Leandri
(2003) questions the logistic distribution assumed for the random truncation point on the
grounds that the choice of this specific distribution is not rooted in empirical evidence.
Because this assumption greatly influences the results, he concludes that further
investigation is needed to measure the capital charge’s sensitivity to various types of
distributions. The author also maintains that there is no clear evidence of fit robustness
of the logit-exponential function to the loss data since the tail Q-Q plot fit test
deteriorates toward the tail of the loss distribution. As to the main conclusion of the
Fontnouvelle et al (2003)’s paper, that is, the true distribution of operational risk large
losses does not vary across business lines, the author contrasts with two evidences –
namely, the raw data that differs across business lines and the median of the empirical
distribution that also differs across business lines.
In recent study, Fontnouvelle et al. (2004) carry out an empirical exercise
consisting of modeling operational risk using only internal operational loss data from
2002 Loss Data Collection Exercise (LDCE)32. Essentially, the study aims at
understanding modeling issues faced by banks that start collecting operational loss data.
For the largest losses, results show that severity ranking of event types is similar across
banks and heavy-tailed distributions reasonably fit the data. In addition, the tail parameter
estimates for the loss severity distribution are quite similar to the ones based on publicly

32

The 2002 LDCE asked participating banking organizations to report the amount of individual operational
losses during 2001, internal capital allocation for operational risk, expected operational losses, and a
number of exposure indicators related to specific business lines. (BCBS, 2003).
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available losses (Fontnouvelle et al. 2003). The authors investigate whether a full-data33
approach might work for certain loss event types or business lines. Results indicate that
for a typical bank, this is not a reasonable way to model operational risk. We now turn to
the review of the second step of the AMA implementation, that is, the estimation of the
loss frequency distribution.
2.2.2.3 Loss Frequency Modeling
Existing literature on operational risk loss frequency modeling includes Cruz (2002),
Fontnouvelle et al. (2003), Frachot and Roncalli (2002), Fontnouvelle et al. (2004),
Moscadelli (2004), Chavez-Demoulin at al. (2005) and Neslehova et al. (2006).
Cruz (2002) indicates that the negative binomial distribution is probably the most
popular loss frequency distribution in operational risk after the Poisson distribution. It is a
two-parameter distributions and as such, is more flexible in shape that the Poisson
distribution. Results from Fontnouvelle et al. (2004) and Moscadelli (2004) show that the
negative binomial distribution provides a good fit to the frequency of operational risk
losses. On the other hand, Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) and notably, Frachot and Roncalli
(2002) develop a model in which Poisson distribution plays a critical role.
Frachot and Roncalli (2002) argue that a bank’s internal loss frequency data only
provide partial information about the bank’s specific riskiness and the effectiveness of its
risk management practices. As a result, bank’s average historical loss frequencies need to
be adjusted while assessing capital requirement. The authors use credibility theory to
handle this specific issue. Typically, they assume that for a bank, the number of loss

33

This methodology involves fitting parametric loss severity (heavy-tail or light-tailed) distributions over
the entire range of loss amounts.
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events for a business line/loss event type is Poisson distributed with its parameter equal to
the unobserved riskiness multiplied by the gross income used as the exposure indicator.
The unobserved riskiness is assumed to be gamma distributed with two parameters. They
focus on the random variable represented by the number of loss events conditional to
historical loss frequencies and compute its expected value as well as its distribution.
Frachot et al. (2003) point out that the aforementioned method as well as
approach that uses a square-root pattern to scale external frequencies require large data
sets that are not currently available. As a result, such computational approaches cannot be
implemented and the use of internal loss frequencies validated by the bank’s expert
should be recommended.
Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) model the frequency of publicly available operational
losses by using the standard assumptions behind the GPD model which require the
frequency of large losses to be Poisson distributed. The Poisson parameter is calibrated
using results of the 2002 LDCE and the fact that a typical internationally active bank
experiences an average of 50 to 80 losses beyond one million dollar per year, depending
on its size, control environment and riskiness of its business lines.
Recently, Chavez-Demoulin et al (2005) advocate the use of point process
methodology for an advanced loss frequency modeling. They maintain that the issue of
dependence can be elegantly analyzed through this approach. This will be investigated in
more details in the chapter 3. We now review the modeling of the capital charge.
2.3.2.1 Capital Charge Modeling
In operational risk modeling, the regulatory capital requirement is generally defined in
three different ways. The first definition considers the capital requirement as the 99.9
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percentile of the aggregate loss distribution which means that both expected loss (EL)
and unexpected loss (UL) account for it (BCBS, 2004). The second definition calls for
unexpected loss only according to BCBS (2004) requirements. Alternatively, Frachot et
al (2003) determine the capital charge as the 99.9 percentile of the aggregate loss
distribution where only above-the-threshold individual losses are taken into account. In
all cases, the focus is on the estimation of the aggregate loss distribution for a given time
horizon to determine the Value-at-risk at a specific rating target greater or equal to 99.9
percent.
Within the standard LDA, the distribution of the aggregate loss is commonly
estimated either by means of Panjer’s recursion formula or through Monte Carlo
simulation scheme. The latter approach is based on a two-stage calculation. The first step
simulates a value of the counting process and the second stage generates several
severities (depending on the simulated value of the counting process) and aggregates
them. Capital charge accuracy is sensitive to the number of simulations in the Monte
Carlo scheme and to the number of grid points in the Panjer algorithm (Frachot et al,
2001).
The overall capital charge for the firm is determined by aggregating the capital
charge as computed above, taking into account correlations or more specifically
dependence structure across business line/loss event type cells.
Frachot et al (2003) recognize that the capital charge is driven by two sources of
randomness and therefore by two sources of correlation – namely, frequency and
severity. However, the authors argue that within the standard actuarial model “it is
conceptually difficult to assume simultaneously severity-independence within each class
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of risk and severity-correlation between two classes”. As a result, they believe that the
correlation between aggregate losses by event type is essentially driven by the underlying
correlation between frequencies
Frachot et al. (2004) carry out an empirical exercise related to the estimation of
correlation between aggregate losses. They restrict the investigation to the case where
only frequencies are correlated. Essentially, the authors compute the formula of the
covariance between two aggregate losses associated to two classes and find out that the
aggregate loss correlation is always lower than the frequency correlation. In addition,
their results indicate that for high severity risk types, aggregate loss correlations may be
very small even if the frequency is high. On the other hand, for high frequency– low
severity risk, aggregate loss correlations approximate the frequency correlation.
However, as evidenced in McNeil et al. (2005) page 205 and emphasized in ChavezDemoulin et al. (2005), low correlations do not necessary implied weak dependence.
2.2.2.4 Confidence Interval
In many views (see Frachot et al. 2003; Embrects et al. 2003), the data paucity that
characterizes operational risk category has the potential to lead to unstable estimates of
distribution parameters. Frachot et al (2003) provide a three-stage process to determine
the capital charge’s empirical distribution as well as its confidence interval. The first
stage derives the distribution of the underlying estimators of the parameters of the
counting process and the loss severity. The second step generates from these distributions
a large set of simulated values. Lastly, for each path, the third step computes the capital
charge to get its empirical distribution. In the sequel we examine the first and the third
step in detail.

46

Two different methodologies can be employed to obtain the distribution of the estimators
of the parameters – namely, the bootstrap method and the Gaussian approximation from
the maximum likelihood theory. The authors recommend the Gaussian approximation
due to its relative easiness. Results in this setting indicate that increasing the size of the
loss data set improves the accuracy of the severity estimates while expanding the number
of recorded years enhances the precision of the frequency estimate.
Specifically, Frachot et al (2003) address the accuracy of the capital charge estimate by
defining and computing a coefficient denoted c, obtained from the following expression.
n ≥ (1-c) × VaR}=α
Pr{VaR

n denotes the capital charge estimate, VaR its true value and α the level of
Where VaR
confidence. The authors contend that such a coefficient is appropriate for supervisory
purposes since regulators are interested in assessing the risk of under-estimating the
capital charge. To illustrate the case, they find out that for 1000 losses, the capital charge
may be undervalued by less than 15 percent for a 95 percent confidence level. The
authors also use their confidence interval framework to derive the analytical expression
of the minimum number of observations needed to achieve a specific accuracy for the
capital charge.
2.2.2.5 Self-Assessment and Scenario Analysis
Scenario analysis is performed by banks’ experienced managers to adjust the level of
riskiness conveyed by the bank’s historical loss data. This is particularly the case for
business lines/loss event types for which historical loss data are infrequent. Frachot et al
(2003) mention a methodology by which useful information from expert’s scenarios can
be extracted and plugged into a standard LDA. More specifically, the approach is to
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embed the scenarios into constraints on the parameters of the counting process and the
loss severity distribution. As such, the parameters are calibrated by means of a
constrained maximum likelihood optimization procedure that uses the loss data along
with the scenario restrictions.
2.2.2.6 Back-Testing
Back-testing a risk model, as mentioned in Marshall (2001) involves measuring the
performance of the model by examining any divergence between realized losses and
historical estimates from the model. There is a compelling need to back-test risk model
periodically and also following any major event. This helps evaluate the accuracy of the
model and determine whether some major structural changes have occurred. Cruz (2002)
presents four tests that provide multiple sources of information on the accuracy of the
model. These include the clustering of the violations (that reveals whether the model was
incapable of protection against unexpected losses), the frequency of the violations and the
size of the violations that necessitates a specification of loss boundaries for the
acceptance of the model. Also included is the size of the over/under allocation which
quantifies the difference between the average operational losses and the operational risk
capital on a daily basis for example.
Cruz (2002) also indicates that operational risk back-testing consists of two stages
- the basic analysis and the statistical analysis. The basic analysis aims at reporting a
summary of the findings to the analyst that checks whether the model fits well. If this test
is conclusive, then the statistical analysis is performed. Three types of statistical tests are
mentioned in Cruz (2002). Besides the author’s specific model which is based on
extremal index and appropriate for operational risk, the two other tests include Kupiec
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test, and the Crnkovic-Drachman test34. The two latter tests are already in use for market
risk models.
According to Cruz (2002), the basic idea in the extremal index test is to check the
clustering of extreme events and investigate whether the model errors are correlated. The
Kupiec test (or K test) attempts to verify whether the violation ratio of the model is in
line with some specific confidence level. Finally, the Crnkovic-Drachman test (or Q test)
as mentioned in Cruz (2002) focuses on analyzing the difference between the probability
distribution function of the prediction with the uniform distribution, and thereby assesses
the fitness of the predictions.
Contrary to the market VaR models which are validated against the P&L on a
daily basis, Operational VaR models require to be tested against the losses themselves,
taking into account the time lag between the event and its effect on the earnings (Cruz ,
2002).

34

See Kupiec (1995) and Crnkovic and Drachman, J. (1996)
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CHAPTER 3
THE MODEL
3.1 Introduction
As mentioned earlier, the Committee suggests three approaches to calculating operational
risk capital charges in a “continuum” of increasing sophistication and risk sensitivity
(BCBS, 2001c). These are (i) the Basic Indicator Approach; (ii) the Standardized
Approach and (iii) the Advanced Measurement Approaches. The discussion to follow
formulates the mathematical expression of each approach, and subsequently investigates
the implications for modeling the Advanced Measurement Approaches, especially the
various components of the Loss Distribution Approach. These include the loss severity
distribution, the loss frequency distribution, the risk dependence structure, and lastly, the
overall capital charge. Specifically, this chapter presents a promising mathematical
framework based on point process methodology (see Pfeifer and Neslehova 2004 and
Chavez-Demoulin et al. 2005), within which aggregate losses are efficiently formulated
and risk dependence engineered and simulated. This dissertation uses the aforementioned
framework as well as copulas and finite mixture distribution framework to propose a
methodology that achieves the estimation of the empirical probability distribution
function of the capital charge. As to the loss severity probability distribution function,
publicly available operational loss data set is used for the empirical exercise. An efficient
symbolic computational framework to estimate the parameters of the loss severity
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according to the model suggested in Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) is provided. An extension
of the model to calibrate loss severities of specific firms is proposed as well.

3.2 BCBS Models for the Capital Charge
3.2.1 Basic Indicator Approach
The capital charge K BIA under this specific approach is expressed as:
K BIA = α ×GI
where GI denotes the average annual gross income over the previous three years and α
a coefficient set by the Committee to 15 percent.

3.2.2 Standardized Approach
Under the Standardized Approach, the capital charge K SA is equal to:
8

K SA = ∑ β (i )GI (i )
i =1

where GI (i ) stands for the average annual gross income over the previous three years for
business i and β (i ) ∈ [12%,18%], i = 1, 2,...,8 set by the Committee

3.2.3

Advanced Measurement Approaches

The Advanced Measurement Approaches encompass three approaches described in the
following lines.
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3.2.3.1 Internal Measurement Approach

The capital charge K IMA is expressed as:
8

7

K IMA = ∑∑ γ (i, j )e(i, j )
i =1 j =1

where for business line/loss event type (i, j ) cell, e(i, j ) and γ (i, j ) represents the
expected loss and a scaling factor, respectively.
3.2.3.2 Scorecard Approach

The capital charge K SCA is equal to
8

7

K SCA = ∑∑ GI (i, j )× ω (i, j )× RS (i, j )
i =1 j =1

where for business line/loss event type (i, j ) cell, GI (i, j ) denotes the average annual
income over the previous three years, ω (i, j ) a scaling factor, and RS (i, j ) a risk score.

3.2.3.3 Loss Distribution Approach

The notation used to describe this approach is in line with Furrer (2004) page 14.
One represents the operational loss data set as follows:
⎧⎪ Ltk (i, j ), t ∈ {T − m + 1,..., T −1, T } (m years),
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
i ∈ {1, 2,...,8} (business line),
⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪
j ∈ {1, 2,..., 7} (loss event type),
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
k ∈ {1, 2,..., N t (i, j )} (number of losses for the period [t,t+1])
⎪⎩
where Ltk (i, j ) denotes an individual loss.
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For each business line/loss event type (i, j ) cell , let AggLT +1 (i, j ) denote its aggregate loss
T +1

over the period [T ,T + 1] . Then, AggL

N T +1 ( i , j )

(i, j ) =

∑

LTk +1 (i, j )

k =1

For the sake of simplicity regarding the notation, the following rules are adopted through
out the text:
(1) Within a business line/loss event type (i, j ) cell, when there is no need to address
(i, j ) , one uses ( Lk ) k ∈` , ( N t )t≥0 , ( AggLt )t≥0

(2) To address a specific business line or loss event type (i ) for a time period equal to 1
year, we have:
L(i ) , ( Lk (i )) k ∈` , N (i ) , AggL(i )
Now, the capital charge K (i, j ) for a cell (i, j ) is expressed as the 99.9 percentile
of the aggregate loss distribution.
−1
T +1
K (i, j ) = FAggL
)
T +1 (99.9%) = VaR99.9% ( AggL

−1
T +1
where FAggL
(i, j ) ,
T +1 denotes the quantile function of the aggregate loss function AggL

and VaR stands for the Value at Risk.
For the whole institution, the Committee first suggests expressing the capital charge as
follows:
8

7

K LDA = ∑∑ K (i, j )
i =1 j =1

which is achieved under the assumption of comonotonicity of the vector

( K (1,1),..., K (8, 7)) . As formulated in McNeil et al. (2005) page 199, K (1,1),..., K (8, 7)
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d

are comonotonic if and only if ( K (1,1),..., K (8, 7))= (v1 ( z ),..., v56 ( z )) for some random
variable z and increasing functions v1 ,..., v56 .
Coherent risk measures such as Conditional Tail Expectation and Wang
Transform Measure35 could be used to calculate the capital charges at some specific
rating target. This consideration is left to future research. The next subsection presents
the framework and assumptions behind the Loss Distribution Approach.

3.3 Loss Distribution Approach
3.3.1 The Framework
In the sequel, two contexts in which the Loss Distribution Approach could be modeled
are presented. These include the standard Cramer-Lundberg model and the point process
methodology envisioned as an extension of the first model.
3.3.1.1 The Cramer-Lundberg Model

This presentation is close in spirit to Embrechts et al. (1997) page 22. The classical
Cramer-Lundberg model underlying the Loss Distribution Approach assumes the
following regarding the four stochastic processes described by the model.
1- The claim or loss sizes ( Lk ) k ∈N are positive iid random variables with finite mean
and variance. Notice that the terms claim and loss are used interchangeably.

35

See Wang (2002)
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2- The inter-arrival claim times Y1 = T1 , Yk = Tk − Tk −1 , k = 2,3,... where (Tn ) n≥1 is
a sequence of random variables such that 0 < T1 < T2 < .... a.s. are iid
exponentially distributed with finite mean E (Y1 ) =

1
λ

3- The claim counting defined as the number of claims in the interval [0, t ] is
expressed as N t = sup{n ≥ 1: Tn ≤ t}, t ≥ 0
The counting process ( N t )t≥0 is required to satisfy the following three conditions.
For all t , h ≥ 0
N0 = 0
Nt ∈ `
N t ≤ N t +h
4- The total claim amount or the aggregate losses ( AggLt )t≥0 is modeled by random
, Nt = 0
⎪⎧⎪0
⎪⎪ Nt
sums and defined as AggLt = ⎨
⎪⎪∑ Li , N t > 0
⎪⎪⎩ i=1

5- In addition, the sequences ( Lk ) k ∈N and (Yk ) k ∈ N are independent of each other.
As a consequence of this set of assumptions, it follows that:
(1) The process ( N t )t≥0 is a homogeneous Poisson process with intensity λ , that is
P ( N t = k ) = e−λt

(λt ) k
, k = 0,1, 2...
k!

(2) The processes ( Lk )k ∈N and ( N t )t≥0 are independent and the process ( AggLt )t≥0 is a
compound Poisson process
Notice that in the case where the inter-arrival claim times are iid with arbitrary
distribution, the counting process is defined as a renewal process. The expression renewal
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process arises from a special type of random process, where the events represent
replacement of an item.
3.3.1.2 The Point Process Methodology

Pfeifer and Neslehova (2004) show that point process methodology is as an appropriate
approach to modeling dependent loss processes in insurance and finance. The authors
develop two models that aim at engineering dependent risk in this specific context. This
subsection defines and summarizes the point process methodology useful to formulate the
correlation between aggregate losses of operational risk categories. Next, it depicts the
two above-cited models.
Definitions
A point process is a distinct class of stochastic process, for which the time points
of the occurrence of events are random. Specifically, a point process encompasses a
counting process as well as an inter-arrival time process. The simplest point process is the
homogeneous Poisson process while the marked point processes as stated by Rolski et al.
(1998) page 493 extend standard point processes by incorporating other information
about the claims like their size or type. Other constructions are superposition and
clustering of point processes that generate new point processes. Pfeifer and Neslehova
(2004) page 352 define finite point processes as follows:
Definition 1: (finite point processes)
Let N stand for a non-negative integer-valued random variable and (Ti )i∈N be a family
of iid random vectors with values in [0, ∆]d independent of N , for some fixed dimension
d ∈ ` . All components of Ti are assumed to be in the interval [0, ∆] . In this specific
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N

case, ∆ is one year. Then the random measure36 ξ := ∑ ITi is referred to as a (finite)
i =1

point process with counting variable N and multiple event points (Ti )i ∈N . In this setting,
IT stands for the Dirac measure concentrated in the point T ∈ [0, ∆]d , that is
⎪⎧1, T ∈ A
for all sets A ⊆ [0, ∆]d
IT ( A) = ⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩0, T ∉ A
Note that this definition assumes a common counting random variable N for each
component of the iid random vectors of the family (Ti )i∈N .
Definition 2:
A point process ξ is called a finite Poisson point process, if the common counting
variable N is Poisson-distributed.
The following result in Chavez-Demoulin et al. (2005), page 18, is useful for modeling
and simulating dependent Poisson process triggered by a common effect.
N

Let ξ := ∑ ITi denote a finite Poisson point process with d-dimensional event points
i =1

Ti = (Ti (1),..., Ti (d )) . Each of the marginal processes,
N

ξ (k ) = ∑ ITi ( k ),

k = 1,..., d ,

i =1

is therefore a one-dimensional Poisson point process with intensity E ( N ) Fk (.) where
Fk (.) represents the k -th margin of the joint distribution F of the Ti .

36

Simply stated, a measurable function is such that the inverse image of a “nice” set is “nice”.

A random measure is a measurable function ξ defined on some probability space taking values almost
surely on a space with some “nice” properties (see Kallenberg, 1983). Well known examples of random
measures include the empirical process µn = n

−1

∑

and point processes.
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n

δ where the X i ' s are iid random variables

i =1 X i

N

Conversely, if ξ (k ) = ∑ ITi ( k ),

k = 1,..., d , are one-dimensional Poisson processes, then

i =1

N

ξ := ∑ ITi with Ti = (Ti (1),..., Ti (d )) is a d-dimensional Poisson point processes with
i =1

intensity measure E ξ (.) = E ( N ) F (.) where F stands for the joint distribution of Ti .
Point process dependence engineering

Chavez-Demoulin et al. (2005) page 23 point out that a suitable theory of dependence for
processes do not really exist. However, if the process is Lévy, the recent concept of Lévy
copulas37 provides a fruitful approach. Alternatively, Griffiths et al. (1979) define the
correlation between two one-dimensional point processes ξ (1) and ξ (2) as the correlation
coefficient

ρ (ξ (1)( A), ξ (2)( B)) between the random variables ξ (1)( A) and ξ (2)( A) for

some Borel sets38 A, B ⊂ \ . Chavez-Demoulin et al. (2005) use this specific background
as well as approaches suggested in Pfeifer and Neslehova (2004) to model dependent
aggregate losses assuming stationary and independent loss amounts. They retrieve key
results from Frachot et al. (2004) and Powojowski et al. (2002). The two approaches set
forth in Pfeifer and Neslehova (2004) include:
Approach 1:
This methodology yields Poisson point processes equipped with a common random
N

number N of events. Let ξ := ∑ ITi be a Poisson point process with iid d - dimensional
i =1

event-time points Ti = (Ti (1),..., Ti (d )) whose joint distributions for each i are given

37
38

See Tankov (2004), Cont and Tankov (2004), Kallsen and Tankov (2004)
A Borel set is an element of a family of sets with some “nice” properties (sigma-field generated by all
intervals).
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through

a

copula39

N

ξ (k ) = ∑ ITi ( k ),

function

CT .

Then

the

marginal

processes

k = 1,..., d are Poisson, but dependent. For all Borel sets A, B ⊂ \ , the

i =1

correlation between two processes ξ ( j ) and ξ (k ) is expressed as
ρ (ξ ( j )( A), ξ (k )( B )) =

Fj , k ( A× B)
Fj ( A) Fk ( A)

j , k ∈ {1,..., d }

where Fj ,k stands for the joint distribution of Ti ( j ) and Ti (k ) and Fj and Fk denote the
marginal distributions of Ti ( j ) and Ti (k ) , respectively. As pointed out in Pfeifer and
Neslehova (2004), the marginal processes have a common counting random variable
N and as a result, only positively correlated Poisson distribution can be achieved through

this methodology.
Approach 2:
This approach is based on two steps. First, different dependent Poisson random variables
N (1),..,, N (d ) governed by a specific copula CN are generated. Then, the occurrence
time points Ti (k ) that are possibly dependent, are produced as margins of a
d - dimensional event-time points Ti = (Ti (1),..., Ti (d )) . As a result, d dependent
N (k )

processes ξ (k ) = ∑ ITi ( k ),

k = 1,..., d , governed by a copula CT are constructed.

i=1

If the Ti (k ) are mutually independent, the corresponding correlation can be specified as

ρ (ξ ( j )( A), ξ (k )( B)) = ρ ( N ( j ), N (k )) Fj ( A) Fk ( A)

39

j , k ∈ {1,..., d }

Typically, a copula function links univariate marginal distributions to their joint distribution.
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Two facts are worth mentioning here. First, the joint d - dimensional point process is not
in general a Poisson process. Second, negative correlations are attainable because the sign
of ρ ( N ( j ), N (k )) could be negative.
As it is stated in Chavez-Demoulin et al. (2005) page 25, a wide range of models
can be constructed from these approaches to gain insight into the dependence structure of
operational risk types. For instance, thinning of specific processes or superposition of
independent homogenous Poisson point processes with homogeneous positively
dependent Poisson point process is achievable.
In the next paragraph, we proceed along the lines of the two abovementioned
methodologies to present three key findings related to the correlation between aggregate
losses of operational risk types.
Dependent Aggregate Losses

This presentation closely follows Chavez-Demoulin (2005) Page 26. The basic idea is to
incorporate

the

loss

amounts

into

the

point

process

modeling.

Let

AggL(1) and AggL(2) denote two aggregate losses related to two operational risk types
and let [0, ∆] stands for some period of time. The loss amounts are assumed to be
stationary and independent. In addition, the loss occurrence times of each risk type
N (k )

establish a Poisson point process ξ (k ) = ∑ ITi ( k ), k = 1, 2 . Let Li (1) and Li (2) represent
i =1

the severities related to Ti (1) and Ti (2) , respectively. The severities are each iid and
Li (1) and L j (2) independent of one another for i ≠ j . Using the marked point processes
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framework, it is then possible to describe the entire risk process as point processes as
N (k )

indicated by ξ (k ) = ∑ I(Ti ( k ), Li ( k )), k = 1, 2
*

i =1

The resulting aggregate losses are specified as follows:
N (1)

N (2)

k =1

k =1

AggL(1) = ∑ Lk (1) and AggL(2) = ∑ Lk (2)

The correlation between AggL(1) and AggL(2) is now expressed in terms of various types
of dependence between the underlying loss occurrences processes ξ (1) and ξ (2) .
Case1: Modeling ξ (1) and ξ (2) according to Approach 1 gives rise to the correlation
coefficient suggested in Pfeifer and Neslehova (2004).
ρ ( AggL(1), AggL(2)) =

E ( L1 (1) L1 (2))
E ( L1 (1) 2 ) E ( L1 (2) 2 )

provided that E ( L1 (1) 2 ) < ∞ and E ( L1 (2) 2 ) < ∞
Case 2: In case Li (1) and Li (2) are independent for any i , Approach 2 yields:
ρ ( AggL(1), AggL(2)) = ρ ( N (1), N (2))

E ( L1 (1)) E ( L1 (2))
E ( L1 (1) 2 ) E ( L1 (2) 2 )

as described in Frachot et al. (2004).
A simple example of superposition (common Poisson shock) is constructed when the
processes ξ (1) and ξ (2) are set as the sum of independent homogeneous Poisson point
processes ξk with intensities λk , k = 1, 2,3 , that is ξ (1) = ξ1 + ξ3 and ξ (2) = ξ2 + ξ3 .
It follows that
ρ ( N (1), N (2)) =

λ3

(λ1 + λ3 )(λ2 + λ3 )

and therefore
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⎛
⎞⎟ E L (1) E L (2)
( 1 ) ( 1 )
⎜⎜
λ3
⎟⎟
ρ ( AggL(1), AggL(2)) = ⎜
⎟
⎜⎜ (λ + λ )(λ + λ ) ⎟⎟ E L (1) 2 E L (2) 2
(1 ) (1 )
⎝
1
3
2
3 ⎠
This example appears in Powojowski et al. (2002). The subsection devoted to the loss
frequency distribution discusses it in more details. The next subsection considers the
calibration of the loss severity distribution using the assumptions mention earlier, that is,
loss severities are stationary and independent.

3.3.2 Loss Severity Distribution Models
3.3.2.1 Publicly Available Operational Loss Modeling

This subsection focuses on the calibration of the loss severity distribution, using publicly
available operational loss data set. As noted earlier, this specific data set is plagued by
many biases that impede one’s ability to uncover the true underlying loss severity
distribution. The following lines build on Fontnouvelle et al (2003) and suggest a
symbolic computational approach that makes such a calibration easier.
Frachot et al. (2003) and Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) assume that contributors’
operational loss data are sampled from the same probability distribution40, and as such are
not different from each other. However, losses are captured according to some
unobserved random truncation point that needs to be accounted for. One way to proceed
is to jointly estimate the parameters of the loss distribution as well as those of the random
truncation point. The random truncation point modeling is described as follows.
Let us consider two independent random variables

X and H

and let

f X |H ( x | h < x) denote the probability density function of the observed values of X (that
is, X is observed when it exceeds the unobserved truncation point H ).
40

See also Okunev (2005).
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f X |H ( x | h < x) is expressed as41:
f X |H ( x | h < x) =

f X ( x) FH ( x)

∫ f X (t ) FH (t )dt

\

where f X ( x) and FH ( x) represent the probability density function and the cumulative
distribution function of

X and H , respectively. Random truncation modeling is

generally used in economics, reliability, and astronomy. In this latter field, it is known as
the Malmquist bias in the study of galaxies.
Now let L denote the random variable representing the operational loss amount,
u the nominal threshold ($1 million) and X = log( L) − log(u ) | L > u the conditional

excess loss. Notice that X = log( L) | L > 1 since u = 1 . If one assumes that the distribution
of operational losses of a specific business line/event type cell belong to the maximum
domain of attraction of either the Frechet distribution or the Gumbel distribution and if
one considers u as a sufficient high threshold, results from EVT (Embrechts et al, 1997
page 148), indicate that the distribution function of X may be approximated by
⎛ x⎞
G0,β ( x) = 1 − exp ⎜ − ⎟
⎝ β⎠

g0,β ( x) =

which

is

the

exponential

distribution

with

density

⎛ x⎞
exp ⎜ − ⎟ .
β
⎝ β⎠

1

As to the random truncation point H * , in addition to the known and constant case, this
study assumes two other distributions for H = log( H * ) , namely the logistic distribution as

41

See Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) for the proof.

63

in Fontnouvelle (2003) and the normal distribution42. A fourth case, worth mentioning is
that of the alpha stable non Gaussian exponentially truncated distributions. This class of
distributions is gaining importance in empirical finance in that it provides better fit of the
tails of distribution than normal distributions. As pointed out by Nolan (2001), these
distributions are now more computationally tractable and should be part of quantitative
risk managers’ toolkit. This will be examined in future work.
Let ( X , H ) denote the random vector representing the conditional excess log
losses and the log random truncation point, let ( H < X ) denote the event that
characterizes publicly available operational risk loss data. For the random truncation
point distribution, let σ and µ denote the scale and location parameters respectively.
For the normal distribution,
FH (h) =

1
2πσ

⎛ 1 ⎛ t − µ ⎞2 ⎞
⎛h−µ ⎞
exp
⎜
∫ ⎜ − 2 ⎜⎝ σ ⎟⎠ ⎟⎟dt = Φ ⎜⎝ σ ⎟⎠
−∞
⎝
⎠
h

where Φ denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function.
For the logistic distribution,
FH (h) =

1
⎛ h−µ ⎞
1 + exp ⎜ −
σ ⎟⎠
⎝

The expression of the loss severity pdf is then described as follows:

42

See Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) page 12 for a discussion on factors that impact public disclosures of
operational losses.
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⎧
⎛ x ⎞ ⎛ x−µ ⎞
⎪ exp ⎜ − ⎟ Φ ⎜
⎟
⎝ β ⎠ ⎝ σ ⎠ , for the normal case
⎪
⎪ +∞
⎛ t ⎞ ⎛t−µ ⎞
⎪ ∫ exp ⎜ − ⎟ Φ ⎜
⎟ dt
⎝ β ⎠ ⎝ σ ⎠
⎪ ux
⎪
⎛ x⎞
⎪
exp ⎜ − ⎟
⎪
f X |H ( x | h < x ) = ⎨
⎝ β ⎠
⎪
⎛ x−µ ⎞
⎪ 1 + exp ⎜ − σ ⎟
⎝
⎠ , for the logistic case
⎪
⎛ t ⎞
⎪
exp ⎜ − ⎟
⎪ +∞
⎝ β ⎠
⎪∫
dt
⎪ u x 1 + exp ⎛ − t − µ ⎞
⎜
⎪⎩
σ ⎟⎠
⎝

where u x denotes a value related to the date of occurrence of the loss. Its expression is
determined in the sequel.
Since the calibration of the loss severity pdf is performed at the end of 2003, one
needs to express all individual loss amounts in real terms, using various levels of the
Consumer Price Index (CPI). This removes the effect of inflation and allows better
comparison of the individual loss amount across years. The lower bound of the domain of
integration u x is adjusted accordingly. So, in real terms, a loss with nominal value L0 ≥ u
that occurs in year k ≤ 2003 , amounts to L = L0 ×

CPI 2003
in 2003, where CPI k denotes
CPI k

the year k Consumer Price Index. As a result, the lower bound of the set containing all
⎛
CPI 2003 ⎞
conditional excess losses x = log ⎜ L0 ×
⎟ − log(u ) (from losses L0 ≥ u that occur
CPI k ⎠
⎝

in year k ≤ 2003 ) is expressed as

⎛ CPI 2003 ⎞
xklb = log ⎜ u ×
⎟ − log(u )
CPI k ⎠
⎝
⎛ CPI 2003 ⎞
= log ⎜
⎟
⎝ CPI k ⎠

65

Thus,

f X |H

⎧
⎛ x ⎞ ⎛x−µ
⎪ exp ⎜ − ⎟ Φ ⎜
⎝ β ⎠ ⎝ σ
⎪
⎪
⎛ t ⎞ ⎛t−µ
⎪ ∫ exp ⎜ − ⎟ Φ ⎜
⎝ β ⎠ ⎝ σ
⎪ x klb
⎪
⎛ x ⎞
⎪
exp ⎜ − ⎟
⎪
(x | h < x) = ⎨
⎝ β ⎠
⎪
⎛ x−µ ⎞
⎪ 1 + exp ⎜ −
σ ⎟⎠
⎝
⎪
⎪
⎛ t ⎞
exp ⎜ − ⎟
⎪
⎝ β ⎠
⎪
dt
∫
⎪ lb
⎛ t−µ ⎞
x k 1 + exp ⎜ −
⎪
σ ⎟⎠
⎝
⎩

⎞
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎟ dt
⎠

, for the norm al case

, for the logistic case

This means that the support of the probability density function f X |H ( x | h < x) describing

⎡ ⎛ CPI 2003 ⎞
⎞
the observed losses is the interval ⎢ log ⎜
⎟ , +∞ ⎟⎟
⎣ ⎝ CPI k ⎠
⎠
The location parameter µ represents the magnitude of loss that has a 50 percent
chance of being captured, while the scale parameter σ reflects the rate at which the
reporting probability changes as the loss size varies (Fontnouvelle et al., 2003)
3.3.2.2 Symbolic Computational Model

The following subsection describes a symbolic computational approach to estimating the
parameters Θ = ( β , µ , σ ) of the observed loss severity distribution. Specifically, for this
illustration, the log of the random truncation point is assumed to be logistically
distributed.
Suppose that one is interested in estimating the parameters of the severity for a
specific business unit/event type cell. The publicly available operational risk data loss
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consists of n losses beyond $1 million over m years, that is

{{T , L } ,...,{T
k1

1

kn

, Ln

}} where

Tki denotes the year of occurrence of loss Li with 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ ki ≤ m . Since the

study period ranges from 1960 to 2003 Tki ∈ {1960,..., 2003} and m = 2003 −1960 + 1
= 34 years.

{{T , L } ,...,{T

, Ln

⎛ CPI m
xklbi = log ⎜
⎜ CPI k
i
⎝

⎞
⎟ ( CPI ki
⎟
⎠

k1

1

kn

}}

is

then

transformed

for year Tki ) and

into

xi

{{x , x } ,...,{x , x }}
1

lb
k1

n

lb
kn

where

the conditional excess loss (

xi = log( Li ) − log(u ) | Li > u )
The

maximum

likelihood

function

based

on

the

set

of

{{x , x } ,...,{x , x }} is given by
1

lb
k1

n

lb
kn

n

L (Θ | X ) = ∏
i =1

∞

∫

f X ( xi | β ) × FH ( xi | µ , σ )
f X (t | β ) × FH (t | µ , σ )dt

xklb
i

Replacing f X ( xi | β ) and FH ( xi | µ , σ ) by their respective expressions, one gets:
⎛ x ⎞
exp ⎜ − i ⎟
⎝ β⎠
⎛ x −µ ⎞
1 + exp ⎜ − i
n
σ ⎟⎠
⎝
L (Θ | X ) = ∏
⎛ t ⎞
i =1
exp ⎜ − ⎟
∞
⎝ β ⎠ dt
∫lb
⎛ t−µ ⎞
x 1 + exp ⎜ −
⎟
ki
⎝ σ ⎠

67

data

It turns out that this maximum likelihood function is computationally intensive43
because of the convolution of distributions functions appearing in the denominator. To
easy this calculation, a symbolic-numeric approach is adopted.
Since
⎧⎪ ⎛ CPI m ⎞
⎛ CPI m ⎞ ⎫⎪
,...,
log
xklbi ∈ ⎨log ⎜
⎜
⎟⎬
⎟
⎪⎩ ⎝ CPI1 ⎠
⎝ CPI m ⎠ ⎭⎪
and CPI1 ≤ ... ≤ CPI m do not depend on the conditional excess loss amount xi it is

(

)

feasible to symbolically compute the vector of integrals I k1 ,..., I km beforehand.
⎛ t ⎞
exp ⎜ − ⎟
⎝ β ⎠ dt
I ki = ∫
⎛ t−µ ⎞
xlb 1 + exp ⎜ −
⎟
ki
⎝ σ ⎠
∞

Now, one can express the maximum likelihood function as

n

L (Θ | X ) = ∏
i =1

⎛ x ⎞
exp ⎜ − i ⎟
⎝ β⎠
⎛
⎛ x − µ ⎞⎞
yi × ⎜ 1 + exp ⎜ − i
σ ⎟⎠ ⎟⎠
⎝
⎝

where yi = I ki for some ki .
The computational process is now based on the set of data

{{ x1 , y1} ,..., { xn , yn }} .

Specifically, the code of the above algorithm can be implemented in Mathematica
as follows:
Step 1
⎛ CPI m
Define a vector containing xklbi = log ⎜
⎜ CPI k
i
⎝
43

⎞
⎟ as cpiVector
⎟
⎠

See Baud et al, 2002, Fontnouvelle et al, 2003, Frachot et al 2003
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Step 2
Compute the vector of integrals symbolically
⎡ t⎤
exp ⎢ − ⎥
⎣ β ⎦ dt , i,1,Length[cpi]
integralVector=Table[
{
}
∫
⎡ t−µ⎤
cpiVector[[i]] 1 + exp −
⎢⎣ σ ⎥⎦
∞

This vector is computed once and saved on disk for future use. For example, the
expression of I k1 , the first component of integralVector, is expressed in
Mathematica numerics as follows:
1
−1 +

β
σ

i
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
k

−µ I 1 + 1 M
β

σ

i
j
j
j
j
σj
j
j
j
j
k

µêσ

πσ
β
π J− 1 + N CscA
E−
σ
β

µ
β

β Hypergeometric2F1A1, 1 −

σ
β

, 2−

σ
β

,−

σ

Step 3
Define the probability density function as

⎛ x⎞
exp ⎜ − ⎟
⎝ β⎠
f =
⎛
⎛ x − µ ⎞⎞
y × ⎜1 + exp ⎜ −
σ ⎟⎠ ⎟⎠
⎝
⎝
Step 4
Express the maximum likelihood function as
⎡ n
⎤
LogL=Log ⎢∏ ( f / .{ x → xi , y → yi } ) ⎥
⎣ i=1
⎦

Step 5
Compute the observed log-likelihood from a matrix dataMat, containing the
individual losses with their ages.
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−µ
σE

y
y
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
z
zz
{{

sampleLik=LogL/.{n->Length[dataMatrix]} , xi _ :→ dataMat[[i,1]]
yi _ :→ integralVector[dataMat[[i,2]]]}
Step 6
Maximize the objective function sampleLik with an optimization program to get
the estimates of the targeted parameters β , µ, and σ . These values are relevant to
large internationally active banks.
The aforementioned approach is easy to implement, significantly reduces the
computing time and as a result, facilitates the calibration of the loss severity which is a
major issue in operational risk capital modeling. For a specific organization, additional
constraints on the targeted parameters β , µ σ imposed through a risk assessment
framework could be easily plugged into this maximum likelihood paradigm to get the
estimates of the parameters. Setting these constraints is examined in the sequel.
3.3.2.3 Calibration for Specific Organizations

The parameters of the loss severity as well as those of the random truncation point were
jointly estimated assuming that all losses from the data set were incurred by a typical
large internationally active bank (Fontnouvelle et al, 2003 page 3). In the rest of this
dissertation such a large internationally active bank will be simply referred to as an
“industry-wide organization”. Furthermore, it is possible to envision different categories
of industry-wide organizations, each with a specific yearly loss frequency distribution.
This section of the dissertation investigates the extent to which Fitch data set could be
used to calibrate the severity of a specific bank. In other words, if all these losses, drawn
from the same probability distribution, were incurred by a specific firm, how could one
account for the positive correlation that exists between the loss amount and the
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probability of its disclosure44? This is an important question left for future research in
Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) page 22.
The following subsection proposes an approach that uses the concept of Probable
Maximum Loss (PML) to account for firm size, rating, quality of internal control
environment, and market-related factors to estimate the parameters of the distribution of
the random truncation point independently of the maximum likelihood framework
described previously.
The concept of Probable Maximum Loss stems from fire insurance where it has
been noticed that total losses were very infrequent in categories where there are public
fire protection and fire-resistive structures. Bennett (1992) defines the PML as “the
largest possible loss that may occur, in regard to a particular risk, given the worst
combination of circumstances”. Wilkinson (1992) and Kremer (1990, 1994) suggest
expressing

the

PML

as

either

(1 − θ ) E [ M n ] or

E [ M n ] + θ V arM n where

M n = m ax( L1 , ..., L n ) is the maximum of n claims and θ a safety loading coefficient.

Cebrian et al (2004) obtain the PML by solving the following equation
P [ M n ≤ P M Lε ] = 1 − ε ,

for some ε > 0 . In other words, the PML can be considered as a high quantile of the
maximum of a random sample of size n , that is
− 1 (1 − ε ) .
P M L ε = FM
n

This latter formula can be estimated using two different methodologies.
Wilkinson (1992) advocates the use of order statistics, while Kremer (1990, 1994) and

44

See Fontnouvelle et al (2003). The probability of disclosure is also referred to as the reporting
probability.
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Cebrian et al (2004) suggest a methodology rooted in extreme value theory. Now, we are
in a position to describe the proposed model.
It is assumed that for a specific organization, each business line/event type cell
has an explicit random truncation point that is logistically distributed. It is further
assumed that through an appropriate risk assessment exercise or a computational
paradigm as the one described earlier, a PML is assigned to each business line/event type
cell, and this PML reflects the size, the rating, the quality of internal control of the firm as
well as market-related factors. Thus, to derive the scale and location parameters of the
probability distribution function of the truncation point, it suffices to match percentiles at
two different losses.
For a specific firm, let us consider a business line/event type cell endowed with its
PML. For this cell, let Fs denote the probability distribution function of the log random
truncation point log[ H s ] of this specific organization. Similarly, let Fi stand for the
probability distribution function of the log random truncation point Log[ Hi ] of an
industry-wide organization. It is worth noting that the parameters of Fi are jointly
estimated with that of the loss severity pdf using the industry-wide operational losses.
Now, let Fs (log( PML)) denote the probability of the event {H s ≤ PLM } that
characterizes the disclosure of the specific organization’ PML (the reporting probability
of the PML). Likewise, let Fi (log( PML)) stand for the probability of disclosure of the
industry-wide

organization’

PML.

In

Fs (log( PML)) = Pr [log( H s ) ≤ log( PML)] = Pr [ H s ≤ PML ] .
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passing,

note

that

If a risk assessment exercise sets the value of Fs (log( PML)) to a specific level,
(depending on the firm’s size, rating, internal control environment, and market-related
factors), and if, for example, it is further assumed that the median of the two distributions
matches, then one is in a position to derive the parameters of the distribution of the
random truncation point of the specific firm and, thereby, estimate the underlying loss
severity parameter using the maximum likelihood estimation approach. The key finding
is that if Fs (log( PML)) ≥ Fi (log( PML)) , then the underlying loss severity parameter of
the specific firm is lower than that of the industry-wide organization which means that
the specific organization could experience less severe operational losses than the
industry-wide organization. The converse holds true if Fs (log( PML)) ≤ Fi (log( PML)) .
It is worth noticing that this model still assumes that all losses of the data set
could be experienced by the specific firm. However, the random truncation function that
accounts for firm size, rating, internal control environment as well as market-related
factors provides a system of weights that impact the observed losses and thereby the
underling loss severity distribution.
The next paragraph examines different ways to assess the loss frequency
distribution.

3.3.3 Loss Frequency Distribution.
In the standard POT model, it is well known that the number of exceedances of a high
threshold follows a Poisson process45. This result underpins the loss frequency

45

See Embrecht et al. (1997) page 366.
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distribution modeling in this study. To calibrate the distribution, one uses the fact that
large international active banks incur an average of 50 to 80 losses above $1 million each
year, depending on their sizes, control environments and riskiness of their business lines
(Fontnouvelle et al. 2003). As to small-size organizations, expert judgment is also used to
extract the loss frequency distribution function parameters. Besides this base model, this
study presents a simple common Poisson shock framework suggested by Powojowski et
al. (2002) and mentioned in Chavez-Demoulin et al. (2005). Impact of this model on the
capital charge is investigated. Details of the suggested methodology are described as
follows:
The intent of the approach described in Powojowski et al. (2002) is to account for
the correlation of loss frequency across operational loss risk class or unit by means of an
underlying common shock methodology. More specifically, the model is based on the
idea that a set of m independent underlying loss processes, each characterized by a oneN * (i )

dimensional Poisson process, (that is ξ (i ) = ∑ ITq (i ) , where the counting variable
*

q=1

N * (i ) is Poisson-distributed with intensity λ (i ) i = 1,..., m ) can be constructed to
generate the dependence structure of n observed operational

loss processes, each

N ( j)

characterized by one-dimensional point process ξ ( j ) = ∑ ITq ( j ),

j = 1,..., n . Each of

q =1

these underlying loss processes can be ascribed to one or more of the observed
operational loss processes. It turns out that the counting variable N ( j ) of the observed
loss process can be expressed as:
m

N ( j ) = ∑ δ (i, j ) N * (i )
i =1
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where δ (i, j ) denotes the indicator variable.
N ( j ) is therefore Poisson-distributed with intensity
m

τ ( j ) = ∑ δ (i, j )λ (i )
i =1

Intuitively, this model presupposes the existence of common shocks which affect more
than one operational risk class. The covariance and correlation coefficients between
N ( j ) and N (k ) are as follows:
m

Cov( N ( j ), N (k )) = ∑ δ (i, j )λ (i )δik
i =1

m

ρ ( j, k ) =

∑ δ (i, j )λ(i)δ (i, k )
i =1

m

m

i =1

i =1

∑ δ (i, k )λ(i)×∑ δ (i, k )λ(i)
Under this model, only positive correlation is permissible. A simple case that assumes a
single enterprise-wide source of loss is such that m = n + 1 and N ( j ) = N * ( j ) + N * (m) ,

τ ( j ) = λ ( j ) + λ (m) for j = 1,...n
Thus,
Cov( N ( j ), N (k )) = λ (m)
ρ ( j, k ) =

for j , k = 1,...n and

λ ( m)

(λ ( j ) + λ (m))×(λ (k ) + λ (m))

j≠k

This case is investigated through the empirical exercise conducted in this dissertation.
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3.3.4 Modeling Dependence Structure
As a tool to model joint effects of multiple risks, the concept of copula has recently
attracted extensive attention from the financial community as it conveys more meaningful
information about dependence structure than the conventional Pearson correlation. A
typical example is the key concept of tail dependence that will be examined in the sequel.
This subject is relevant to operational risk practitioners since within the BCBS
framework, banks are required to calculate the capital charge for each of the 56 business
line/event type cells and use a dependence structure model to aggregate these values. As
pointed out in Frachot et al. (2003), the dependence structure envisioned by the
Committee is that of aggregate losses since it is this latter dependence structure which is
considered when it comes to aggregating capital charges.
Simply stated, a copula function links univariate marginal distributions to their
joint distribution. A theorem due to Sklar (1959) states that if

X = ( X 1 ,..., X d )

is a

random variable with joint distribution function F , then there exists a copula function
C such that

F ( x1 ,..., xd ) = C ( F1 ( x1 ),..., Fn ( xd ))
where Fi is the ith marginal distribution function, for i = 1, 2,..., d .
Conversely, any given copula C can be used to link any collection of univariate marginal
distribution functions F1 ,..., Fd to create a joint distribution function F that satisfies the
aforementioned relation. It should be noted that the latter statement constitutes the
rationale for the methodology I implement to derive the aggregated capital charges using
various families of copulas. This statement also underpins the concept of meta
distributions as described in McNeil et al. (2005) page 192. Notice also that most of the
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results related to copulas are stated under the assumption of absolute continuity of the
univariate marginals. Indeed, under this requirement, there is a unique copula C such
that for u = (u1 ,..., ud ) ∈ [0,1]d
C (u1 ,..., ud ) = F ( F1−1 (u1 ),..., Fd−1 (ud ))

where
Fi −1 (ui ) = inf { x : Fi ( x) > ui } , i = 1,..., d
are the marginal quantile functions.
When the marginals are not continuous as it is in the case of discrete distributions,
the underlying copula is not unique. Typically, the copula framework becomes more
complicated to tackle and the determination of the dependence structure may involve the
marginals (Neslehova, 2004).
Recent developments on copulas can be found in Marshall (1996) for the discrete
case, Joe (1997), Embrechts et al (1999), Nelsen (1999), Neslehova (2004), and McNeil
(2005). Following is a brief presentation of some useful families of copulas that are
considered in this study.
Tang et al. (2004) describe three classes of copulas that are generally used in
finance and insurance. These are the copulas of extreme dependence, the Archimedean
copulas and the elliptical copulas. The copulas of extreme dependence include the
independence copula, the Frechet lower bound for copulas and the Frechet upper bound
for copulas. The independence copula or product copula Π (u ) is expressed as:

Π (u ) = u1... ud .
while, the Frechet bounds for copulas are
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M (u ) = min(u1 ,..., ud )
and
W (u ) = max(u1 + ... + ud − d + 1, 0)
with
W (u ) ≤ C (u ) ≤ M (u )
Note that for d ≥ 2, M (u ) defines a copula, called the comonotonic copula that
describes a perfect positive dependence structure, while for d > 2 , W (u ) is no longer a
copula. Archimedean copulas or explicit copulas constitute the second class of copulas.
They are based on one generator function, and as such, have simple closed forms (Aas,
2004). This class of copulas allows for asymmetry, and as a result, exhibits greater
dependence in the negative tail or in the positive tail. However these copulas generally
fail to account for multivariate dependence structure as they have one single parameter to
describe the dependence. Examples of Archimedean copulas include the Clayton copula
and the Gumbel copula. Elliptical copulas or implicit copulas comprise the third class of
copulas. Typically, elliptical copulas are copulas implied by elliptical distributions. Wellknown examples of elliptical distributions include multivariate normal, t-student, and
logistic distributions. Elliptical copulas allow for joint extreme events, but fail to account
for asymmetries. In addition, they do not have a simple close form. Regardless of these
shortcomings, they are becoming more and more popular for empirical exercises as they
are remarkably easy to simulate. Tang et al (2004) also acknowledge the flexibility of this
family of copulas to account for differences in pair-wise dependence structure by using a
variance-covariance framework.
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The expressions of the aforementioned copulas are as follows:
For the normal copula:
C (u ) = Φ dR ( Φ −1 (u1 ),..., Φ −1 (ud ) )
where Φ dR denotes the joint distribution function of the d-dimensional multivariate
standard normal distribution function with linear correlation matrix R .
In the bivariate case, the copula expression is:
Cρ (u1 , u2 ) =

Φ −1 ( u1 ) Φ −1 ( u2 )

∫

∫

−∞

−∞

⎧ s 2 − 2 ρ st + y 2 ⎫
1
exp
⎨−
⎬ dsdt
2π (1 − ρ 2 )
2(1 − ρ 2 ) ⎭
⎩

where ρ denotes the parameter of the copula.
The expression of the Student’s t-copula is
C (u ) = tνd, R ( tν−1 (u1 ),..., tν−1 (ud ) )

where tνd, R denotes the joint distribution function of the d-dimensional multivariate
Student’s t-distribution function with linear correlation matrix R and ν degrees of
freedom.
In the bivariate case, the copula expression is:
Cρ ,ν (u1 , u2 ) =

tν−1 ( u1 ) tν−1 ( u2 )

∫ ∫

−∞

−∞

1
2π (1 − ρ 2 )1/ 2

⎧ s 2 − 2 ρ st + y 2 ⎫
⎨1 +
⎬
ν (1 − ρ 2 ) ⎭
⎩

− (ν + 2) / 2

dsdt

where ρ denotes the parameter of the copula.
The Clayton copula in the bivariate case has the following expression:
Cδ (u1 , u2 ) = (u1−δ + u2−δ − 1) −1/ δ

where 0 < δ < ∞ denotes a parameter controlling the degree of dependence.
The Gumbel copula in the bivariate case can be expressed as:
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Cδ (u1 , u2 ) = exp ( −((− log u1 )δ + (− log u2 )δ )1/ δ )

where 1 ≤ δ < ∞ denotes a parameter controlling the degree of dependence.
This study presents the capital charges in the context of comonotonic,
independence, and elliptical copulas. For elliptical copulas, we make use of the converse
statement in Sklar’s theorem that gives rise to various meta distributions (meta- Gaussian
distribution, meta- tν distribution, see McNeil et al. (2005)). The case of Archimedean
copulas will be investigated in future work.
The following is a summary of the algorithm that simulates a vector of dependent
aggregate losses ( AggL(1),..., AggL(d )) with marginal FAggL (1) ,..., FAggL (1) and the
associated elliptical copula C .
For the normal copula, the ith simulated aggregate loss is

( (

−1
−1
−1
AggL(i ) = FAggL
( i ) Φ Ai (Φ (u1 ),..., Φ (ud )

))

where Φ (u ) denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution, A the lower triangular
matrix obtained from the Choleski decomposition of the linear correlation matrix of the
specified copula, and ui for 1 ≤ i ≤ d , are d independent standard uniform variables.
Notice that the normal copula transformation gives rise to the simulation of the
transform of the aggregate losses AggL(i ) , that is AggL* (i ) , under the Wang Transform.
Indeed, by setting
Ai (Φ −1 (u1 ),..., Φ −1 (ud )) = Φ −1 (ui ) + λ

where λ = Φ −1 (α ) , with α denoting the specified rating target or confidence level.
one gets
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( (

−1
−1
AggL* (i ) = FAggL
( i ) Φ Φ (ui ) + λ

))

As to the Student’s t-copula, the ith simulated aggregate loss is
⎛
−1
AggL(i ) = FAggL
t
(i ) ⎜
⎜ν
⎝

⎛ ν
Ai (Φ −1 (u1 ),..., Φ −1 (ud )
⎜⎜
⎝ S

(

⎞⎞

) ⎟⎟ ⎟⎟
⎠⎠

where tν is the Student’s t cumulative distribution function with ν degrees of freedom, A
the lower triangular matrix obtained from the Choleski decomposition of the linear
correlation matrix of the specified copula, S a random number generated from the chisquare distribution random variable χ 2 (ν ) independent from each of the standard normal
variables Φ −1 (ui ) .
We have previously mentioned that elliptical copulas allow for joint extreme
events. To clarify this statement, we need to elaborate on the concept of upper tail
dependence.
Let X ~ FX and Y ~ FY denote a pair of random variables. By definition46, the
upper tail dependence coefficient is formulated as
λu = lim− P (Y > FY−1 (α ) | X > FX−1 (α ))
α→1

This expression measures the probability of observing a large Y , assuming that X is
large. The interpretation of this coefficient is that if λu > 0, extreme events tend to occur
concurrently while in the case where λu = 0, there is no tail dependence and the random
variables X and Y are said to be asymptotically independent.
As to the normal copula characterized by its parameter ρ , the coefficient of the
upper tail dependence is expressed as
46

See McNeil et al. (2005).
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⎛ 1− ρ ⎞⎟
⎟⎟ = 0
λu = 2 lim Φ ⎜⎜⎜ x
x→−∞ ⎜
⎝ 1 + ρ ⎠⎟

For the Student’s t-copula characterized with its parameters ν and ρ , it comes that
⎛ (ν + 1)(1− ρ ) ⎞⎟
⎟⎟
λu = 2tν +1 ⎜⎜⎜−
⎜⎝
1+ ρ
⎠⎟
where tν +1 denotes the distribution function of the univariate Student’s t-distribution with
ν + 1 degrees of freedom ρ the Pearson correlation coefficient between X and Y . The

aforementioned formula expresses the idea that lower degrees of freedom give rise to
heavy tail dependence for the Student’s t-copula. As a result, the copula theory predicts
that the lower the degrees of freedom, the higher the capital charges since the
simultaneous occurrence of extreme events will adversely impact the resulting aggregate
loss distribution from which the capital charge is derived. Figure 6.1 plots upper tail
values in function of the correlation coefficient for 3 degrees of freedom.
For the empirical exercise, this study uses the empirical rank correlations from
which linear correlations are derived and adjusted by expert judgment47. In addition, the
approach developed in Powojowski et al. (2002) is investigated whenever all second
moments of loss severities are finite. Specifically, as shown previously, for two aggregate
losses, we have
ρ ( AggL(i ), AggL( j )) = ρ ( N (i ), N ( j ))

with ρ ( N (i ), N ( j )) =

47

λm

(λi + λm )(λ j + λm )

See Tang et al. (2004) for similar adjustment.

82

E ( L1 (i )) E ( L1 ( j ))
E ( L1 ( j ) 2 ) E ( L1 ( j ) 2 )

provided that E ( L1 (i ) 2 ) < ∞ and E ( L1 ( j ) 2 ) < ∞ . This holds whenever all underlying
loss severity distributions (which are log-exponential or Pareto type I ) have parameters
β strictly less than 0.5.

3.3.5 Capital Charge Modeling
This subsection proposes an approach towards deriving the overall capital charge, taking
into account a whole set of dependence structures.

As a matter of fact, one may

ultimately select the copula that minimizes the distance to the empirical copula of the
data (Romano et al., 2002; Deheuvels, 1979) or extract the matrix of rank correlations
(Kendall’s tau) as well as the degrees of freedom from the data set (see Mashal and
Zeevi, 2002). However, in the context of publicly available operational losses, it is
argued that for each business line/loss event type cell, an accurate estimation of the rank
correlation matrix, the degrees of freedom as well as of the empirical copulas cannot be
obtained due to the lack of sufficient data and the presence of reporting biases in the data
set. Therefore, one way to settle this issue is to account for a family of copulas to get the
empirical distribution of the overall capital charge. In this study, a set of 13 dependences
structures is explored. These include the comonotonic dependence, the Student’s t-copula
with the degrees of freedom ranging from 1 to 10, the normal copula and the
independence copula.
The copula theory, through the upper tail dependence properties predicts that
Capcom ≥ Capt1 ≥ ....Capt10 ≥ Capnormal ≥ Capindep
Capti

where

Capcom

and

for i = 1,...,10 denote the capital charge under the comonotonic dependence and

the student’s t copula, respectively. These will be examined in the empirical exercise.
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Now, we are in a position to describe the approach to estimating the overall capital
charge.
The framework is that of the finite mixture distribution, especially the componentmix distribution in which the overall capital charge is expressed as a mixing weighted
capital charges. Recent literature dealing with distributions formed from componentmixes can be found in Rose et al. (2002) and Titterington et al. (1985).
Specifically, component mix distributions are generated from linear combinations
of distributions. Following Rose et al (2002), in the case of a discrete random variable
X i , let fi ( x) = P( X i = x) for i = 1,..., n, denote the probability mass function and let

π i denote a parameter such that 0 ≤ π i ≤ 1 and

n

∑π
i =1

i

= 1 . Then, the n-component-mix

random variable is defined as
X ~ π 1 X 1 + ... + π n X n
and its probability mass function is expressed as
n

f ( x) = ∑ π i fi ( x)
i =1

The parameters π i for i = 1,..., n, are defined as the mixing weights and the
functions fi for i = 1,..., n, are called the component densities.
The abovementioned formula applied to our framework calls for three remarks.
First, a weight is attached to each capital charge that reflects a specific dependence
structure. Specifically, π 1 is attached to f1 the distribution of the capital charge obtained
under the comonotonic copula. Second, it is assumed that these mixing weights could be
determined through a risk assessment exercise so as to reflect organizations’ quality of
internal control environment. For example for firms with improved internal control
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environment, the first weight π 1 assigned to the comonotonic copula, could be set close
to zero. Third, the empirical distribution of the overall capital charge is generated by
Monte Carlo simulation runs from the fi and the mixing weights π i for i = 1,..., n.
Consequently, key descriptive statistics regarding the overall capital charge can be
provided.
In light of these clarifications, the proposed approach can be seen as an efficient
framework that provides not only bounds for the overall capital charge, but also
incentives for banks and insurers to improve their handling of operational risk.
It is worth noticing at this stage that the mathematical formulation of this
approach is particularly simple. Its computational implementation, by contrast, is quite
complex due to the rating target set by the Committee (99.9%), which may require a very
large number of simulation runs to get consistency in the results according the upper tail
dependence properties.
The next section presents the empirical analysis. Key descriptive statistics are
given and various results related to the estimation of the loss severity distribution for
industry-wide banks and insurers as well as for specific firms are analyzed. The
sensitivity of the capital charge to the choice of copulas is investigated and finally, the
empirical probability distribution function of the overall capital charge is described.
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CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction
This study examines the implications of using the AMA as a method to assess operational
risk capital charges for banks and insurance companies and analyzes the extent to which
the four key elements of the AMA, that is, internal data, external data, scenario analysis,
and business environment and control factor could be encompassed in a model. The
theoretical model, presented in chapter 3 provides the mathematical background within
which Monte Carlo simulations are carried out to determine the empirical distribution of
the overall capital charge. This chapter describes the empirical investigation using
publicly available operational losses. Section 4.2 describes key descriptive statistics and
motivates the risk classification schemes within which loss severities are calibrated and
capital charges determined. Section 4.3 discusses the calibration of the parameters of the
loss severity distribution using three distributional assumptions for the random truncation
point. Lastly, section 4.4 provides the descriptive statistics as well as the histogram of the
empirical distribution of the overall capital charge.

4.2 The Data Set
The empirical exercise uses publicly available operational losses provided by Fitch Risk
Management. This firm captures financial and non-financial operational risk losses that
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are in excess of $1 million from public sources such as court filings and news reports. In
addition to individual losses, the data set contains various organizations’ exposure
indicators such as number of employees, gross income, assets, physical assets,
compensation, and deposits. Essentially, these large operational losses are used to
supplement banks’ internal loss data in calibrating the tail of the loss severity distribution.
In the sequel, key descriptive statistics related to contributors of losses and
individual losses (that occurred in the United States) are provided. Contributors of losses
are referred to as bank and insurance organizations in the US market that incurred the
losses captured by Fitch.
For the period ranging from 1980 to 2002, Table 1.1 indicates that operational
losses were captured from 1244 bank organizations grouped in 998 parent banks and 381
insurers grouped in 302 parent insurance organizations. The total losses incurred by
these organizations amount to $58,552 million for banks, and $22,535 million for
insurers. In terms of total number of losses per contributor, Table 1.1 also shows that
Fitch has captured only one loss in excess of 1$ million from nearly 80% of contributors.
This is an important fact that impacts the calibration of the underlying loss distribution.
This subsection analyzes the distribution of contributors’ truncation point above
which Fitch captures operational losses. Fitch is supposed to capture and report all losses
in excess of a threshold set to $1 million. The focus here is to investigate the actual
distribution of the truncation point by contributor (See Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) page 10
for more discussion on threshold and truncation point). For US banks, Table 1.2 indicates
that the contributor’s truncation point ranges from $1 million to $1980 million. Among
business lines, Retail Banking has the highest number of contributors, i.e. 599 and the
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highest contributor’s truncation point i.e. $1980 million while Payment and Settlement
has the lowest number of contributors, i.e. 21, and at the same time, the lowest
contributor’s truncation point, i.e. $209 million. As to loss event types- Table 1.3, CPBP
has the highest number of contributors, i.e. 598 and the highest contributor’s truncation
point, i.e. $1980 million. Internal Fraud ranks second in terms of both number of
contributors and contribution’s truncation point.
With regard to the insurance industry-Table 1.4, CPBP has the highest number of
contributors, i.e. 264 and the highest contributor’s truncation point, i.e. $1094 million.
Both bank and insurer contributors’ truncation point are significantly skewed to
the right. According to Table 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4, the coefficient of skewness is 15 for banks
and 5 for insurers. A log scale is thus used to represent the distribution of contributors’
truncation point.
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show the histogram of the contributor’s log-truncation-point
for US banks and insurers. For the first category, according to Table 1.5, the contributor’
truncation point at the 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles are $2 million, $4 million, $12
million, and $80 million, respectively. For the insurers, these percentiles are $2 million,
$5 million, $19 million and $120 million.
The results of these preliminary analyses and considerations visibly suggest that it
would not be appropriate to treat the contributor’s truncation point as constant and known
i.e. $1 million.
As to the size of these contributors, table 2.1 provides summary statistics for
banks and insurers’ exposure proxied by their total revenue. It is noticed that more than
50% of both organizations have no exposure reported. The revenue is clustered according
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to the euclidean distance into 3 categories based on the size of the organizations, i.e.
small size, medium size and large size. According to this classification scheme, within
the US bank contributors, 26 contributors could be considered as large banks while
within the US insurer contributors, 10 could be deemed as large insurers. Table 2.2 shows
that the median of the total revenue amounts to $7,793 million for banks and $9,241
million for insurers. The two aforementioned classifications are used to calibrate the loss
severity distribution according to organization size.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 display the yearly aggregate losses for US banks from 1980 to
2002. One notices the existence of a cycle with peaks in 1984, 1988, 1994, 1998 and
2002. The length of the cycle is approximately four years. The first figure splits the total
yearly aggregate losses into the standard BCBS eight business lines. In 1988 and since
2000, retail banking has become a major business line in terms of yearly aggregate losses.
Trading and Sales ranks second. Figure 3.2 breaks the total yearly aggregate losses into
the seven event types. Clearly, CPBP is the main risk driver of operational risk losses for
US banks. Internal Fraud also accounts for an important part of the total yearly aggregate
losses. Figure 3.3 analyzes CPBP losses by splitting them into various components
defined by Fitch. Deceptive Sales Practices and Concealment followed by Failure to
Disclose appear to be the main risk drivers of CPBP.
As to US insurers, Figure 3.4 indicates that insurers’ operational losses started
increasing from 1992 and that CPBP is also the main risk driver. It may be the case that
insurers’ operational losses are subject to more disclosure from 1992. Similar to US
banks, Figure 3.5 shows that Deceptive Sales Practices and Concealment most account
for insurance CPBP losses.
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Figure 3.6 compares the US bank and insurer yearly aggregate losses and clearly
indicates that banks incurred more operational losses than insurers.
As to loss occurrences, Figure 3.7 displays the US bank yearly loss occurrences
and indicates an upward trend. The same result holds true for the US insurer yearly loss
occurrences as shown by Figure 3.8.
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show total loss amounts and occurrences incurred by the US
banks from 1960 to 2003. Total loss amounts are split into BCBS eight business lines
and seven event types. Retail Banking followed by Trading and Sales is the leading
business line while CPBP and Internal Fraud are the two major loss event types.
As to loss occurrences, Retail Banking has the highest number of individual losses
both overall and specifically for CPBP. Again CPBP among the seven event types shows
the highest number of individual losses. Internal Fraud ranks second. Likewise, for the
US insurers, Table 4.3 indicates that CPBP is the main risk.
One notices that some business lines and event types such as Agency Service,
Payment and Settlement, Damage to Physical Assets and Business Disruption & System
Failure have few observations or no observations.
In view of these results, it seems appropriate to conduct the calibration of the loss
severity as well as the calculation of the capital charges by dividing banks’ activities as
follows:
1- All business lines – CPBP (or relationship risk class according to Fitch
classification).
2- All business lines – Internal Fraud and Employment Practices and Workplace
Safety (or people risk class according to Fitch).
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3- All business lines – Other event types.
Alternatively, for comparison purposes, a classification by business units instead of
business lines is employed.
For the insurance industry, the following classification is used.
1- CPBP
2- Other event types
These calculations are developed and explained in the sequel.

4.3 Loss Severity Distribution Function
The period of study ranges from 1960 to 2002 and is conducted according to the
abovementioned classification. For each business unit, Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 give the
parameters of the observed loss severity distribution that include the underlying loss
severity distribution and the random truncation point distribution. The results indicate
that the constant and known assumption regarding the truncation point yields the highest
level of the loss severity parameter while the logistic assumption gives rise to the lowest
level. Specifically, the constant and known assumption does not account for reporting
bias and assigns a uniform weight to all losses. Further developments (Table 5.7) show
that this line of reasoning leads to a higher level of capital charges and to the belief that
operational risk is extremely risky.
The most risky business unit is Investment Banking that comprises two business
lines, namely Corporate Finance and Trading and Sales. The underlying loss severity
parameters (also referred to as tail parameters) are 2.550, 1.1199 and 1.232 for the
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constant and known assumption, the logistic assumption, and the normal assumption,
respectively. The most risky event type is CPBP, especially for Investment Banking.
As to insurers, tail parameters except for the constant and known assumption are
less than 0.6. This range of tails leads to the conclusion that insurers may be less exposed
to operational risk than banks.
It is to be noted that for a specific business line/loss event type cell i , the
following relationship between the tail parameter β (i ) and the first and second moment of
the loss severity distribution holds:
(1) If β (i ) ≥ 1 then E ( L(i )) = ∞
(2) If 05 ≤ β (i ) < 1 then E ( L(i )) < ∞ and E ( L(i ) 2 ) = ∞
(3) If β (i ) < 0.5 then E ( L(i )) < ∞ and E ( L(i ) 2 ) < ∞
The log likelihood of the three models suggests that the logistic distributional
assumption most accounts for the reporting bias. But since the log likelihood yields a bias
in comparing different distributions, the Akaike information Criterion (AIC) is computed
and the likelihood ratio test is performed to acknowledge the fit of the logistic
distribution (Werneman, 2005). The AIC is defined as follows:
AIC = −2 ln L + 2q
where ln L is the log-likelihood function and q is the number of parameters of the
distribution fitted. The smaller the AIC, the better the model fits the data.
Table 5.2 and Figure 5.2 provide the loss severity and the truncation point
distribution parameters analyzed by business lines. Trading and Sales appears to be the
most risky business line, followed by Agency Services.
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Tables 5.3 and 5.4 provide the results of the loss severity calibration by firm size.
They indicate that small firms, or firms with revenue below the median, have the highest
level of tail parameter. These results are in line with those obtained by Shih et al (2001),
that is the size of an operational loss is weakly related to firm size.
The severity parameter of a specific organization is calibrated using the
methodology previously described. Table 5.5 provides the results of this calibration. The
PML along with its reporting probability is set to $1000 and 0.99, respectively. The
resulting tail parameter is 0.472 when all business lines and event types are combined.
For the most prominent business lines and event types, Figures 5.3 to 5.12 show
the Quantile-Quantile plots, the graph of the observed severity distribution and the
underlying severity distribution. CPBP QQ-plot shows a slight decline in fit towards the
tail of the distribution, while retail banking display a substantial decline in fit. As to
insurers, the QQ-plots cannot be displayed since the acceptance-rejection algorithm used
to simulate the observed loss severities fails to converge48. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov
and Anderson-Darling tests have not been performed because these tests are not
appropriate for distributions of excesses over some thresholds (Moscadelli, 2004 page
43).
Figures 5.13 and 5.14 present the graph of the distribution function of the random
truncation point for both the specific organization and the industry-wide organization.

4.4 Capital Charges
48

Simulating new data from the initial data set using bootstrap technique may help to get the convergence.
This is left for future research. See Moscadelli (2004) page 18 for similar application in operational
risk.
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Value at Risk at 99.9% rating target is the risk measure required by BCBS. This paper
aims at deriving the empirical distribution of the aggregated capital charge so as to reflect
the distribution of estimates of the underlying parameters and randomness of the Monte
Carlo simulations. Specifically, 1 million of aggregate marginal losses and 150 000
aggregate dependent losses are simulated. Aggregate loss empirical rank correlations are
computed from historical data and linear correlations derived from these rank correlations
are adjusted according to expert judgment. Typically, when aggregate loss empirical
correlations are negative, they are adjusted to 4% and when they are greater than 10%,
they are lowered to 10% (see Frachot et al. (2004) and Tang et al. (2004) for similar
adjustment). Table 5.6 shows the sample aggregate loss correlations with their
adjustments. For the base scenario, the estimates are assumed to be non-random. Other
scenarios reflecting estimate and correlation uncertainty as well the risk mitigating
impact of insurance will be examined in future work. The computer program has been
designed accordingly49. Figures 5.15, 5.16, and 5.17 present the distribution of the capital
charges for three event types, while Figure 5.18 gives the distribution of the aggregated
capital charge under the Student’s t-copula with one degree of freedom. In all cases,
distributions are approximately normal. Figure 5.19 plots the aggregated capital charge in
terms of the degrees of freedom for elliptical copulas. It is noticed that the level of capital
charge is inversely related to the number of degrees of freedom. Within this specific
family of copulas, the Cauchy copula gives rise to the highest aggregated capital charge,
while the normal copula yields the lowest aggregated capital charge. This result is in line
with the upper tail dependence property for elliptical copulas. For banks and insurers,

49

A simulated data set accompanied by the Mathematica and C# programs will be made available upon
request to the author.
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Tables 5.10 and 5.11 give the aggregated capital charge along with the capital saving for
both an industry-wide organization and a specific organization. The yearly loss frequency
is assumed to be equal to 50. The highest capital saving is achieved through the
independence copula case. In terms of percentage, the saving ranges from 6% to 11% for
banks, and from 2% to 3% for large insurers. For the specific insurer it ranges from 5% to
10%. For large organizations, the capital savings are less significant for insurers since,
due to lack of sufficient data, two event type subclasses was considered compared to
three for the banks. This result was expected since the diversification benefit increases
with the number of business line/event types used. These levels of capital charge need to
be compared with those obtained by combining all business lines/event types. Table 5.9
allows such a comparison. For a typical large bank, when all business lines and event
types are combined, the capital charge amounts to $3,460 million. In the case where
bank’s activities are divided into three lines, the capital charge for the normal copula
amounts to $6,324 million.
Table 5.12 provides the descriptive statistics for the distribution of the aggregated
capital charge. The amount obtained under the Cauchy copula ranks first for most
locations, scales, and percentile measures. The skewness and kurtosis excess coefficients
are close to those of normal distribution.
The overall capital is then calculated as a mixing weighted capital. The illustrative
case assumes that the weight assigned to each dependence structure is 8% except for the
comonotonic dependence. As to this latter case, the weight is 4%. Table 5.13 provides
these weights. To get the empirical distribution of the weighted capital charges, 1 million
of n-component mix random variables are simulated (n=13). Figure 5.20 and 5.21 show
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the histograms of the mixing weighted capital charge for both the industry-wide
organization and the specific organization. Table 5.14 provides the descriptive statistics.
It shows that for the industry-wide bank, the mixing weighted capital as measured by the
mean of the distribution is $6,433 million while for the specific organization, it amounts
to $443 million.
The last table (Table 5.15) uses the model set in Powojowski (2002) to show the variation
of the capital charge as the common shock intensity increases from 1 to 2. This variation
is $2 million for the specific bank (from $73 million to $75 million) and $1 million for
the specific insurer (from $59 million to $60 million).
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
This dissertation investigates the implications of using the AMA-LDA to model
operational risk capital provisions for banks and insurance companies. My study clearly
reveals that operational risk is a major risk class, as evidenced by the level of capital
charges that banks and insurers are required to hold. My results suggest that the level of
operational risk capital charge could exceed US$6 billion for large internationally active
banks, and US$600 million for large insurers. These amounts are in line with those
disclosed by these institutions, that is, US$2 billion to US$7 billion for banks and 2
percent of net premium on average for insurers. They are also consistent with the
amounts estimated in Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) for banks.
More specifically, this dissertation develops an approach based on the
methodology set forth in Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) to calibrate the tail of operational loss
severity distribution using publicly available operational loss data and accounting for
firm’s specificities through the level assigned to the PML. My study also proposes a
model that expresses the distribution of the overall capital charge as a finite mixture
distribution, accounting for quality of risk management by means of the weight attached
to each component distribution that reflects a specific dependence structure.
Consistent estimates of capital charges and loss severity distribution parameters
are obtained by modeling the contributor’s truncation point as an unobserved random
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variable. In addition, my study makes use of extreme value theory, assumes a
homogeneous Poisson distribution for loss frequencies, and accounts for dependence
structure across risk types through copulas.
My findings also indicate that operational risk losses are driven by CPBP and
internal fraud. As a result, quality of internal control environment of a firm is a key factor
that highly impacts firm’s loss severity distribution and thereby its capital charge
distribution. Consequently, a natural extension of my research will be a formal
quantification of quality of internal risk control environments. The frameworks set by
NAIC50, GLBA, FDICIA, SOX, and BCBS51 will provide an appropriate background for
this exercise.
A further extension of my study would be the quantification of the capital charge
by means of coherent risk measures such as CTE and Wang Transform measure at 95%
confidence level currently used in the insurance industry. Rescaling individual loss
amounts based on firm’s exposure remains a fruitful area for future research as well.
Currently, the scaling formulas that have been proposed in the literature are still in their
infancy due to a lack of adequate loss data to test for their robustness.
Another noteworthy finding lies in the fact that the capital charge is significantly
driven by the number of risk types set out in the bank’s risk classification scheme. As a
result, BCBS needs to provide incentives for banks that use a more granular classification
scheme.
As of today, operational risk accounts for at least 25% of the overall economic
capital of a firm. Consequently, this specific risk class should be envisioned as a key

50
51

Via the Risk-Focused Surveillance Framework.
Through the second pillar (supervisory review) and the third pillar (market discipline).
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component of an enterprise-risk management strategy and failure to account for its capital
requirement significantly distorts decisions based on risk-adjusted return on capital
(RAROC).
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Table 1. 1 --US Bank and Insurers - Number of Losses per Contributor
Banks
Parent Organization

Number of
Losses Per
contributor

Organization

Insurers
Parent Organization
Organization

Number

%

Number

%

Number

%

Number

%

1

791

79

1026

82

217

72

305

80

2 - 9

187

19

202

16

81

27

76

20

>9

20

2

16

1

4

1

0

0

Total

998

100

1244

100

302

100

381

100

Table 1. 2 --US Bank Contributors’ Truncation Point ($ M)
Descriptive Statistics by Business Lines

COFI TRSA

REBA

COBA

PASE

AGSE ASMA REBR

All

Number of
Contributors

47

96

599

237

21

52

121

242

1,244

Minimum

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Maximum

213

1,899

1,980

453

209

536

417

254

1,980

Mean

16

114

18

24

20

24

32

10

23

Standard Deviation

6

18

9

7

7

9

8

5

10

Skewness

4

5

18

5

3

6

4

7

15

Excess Kurtosis

21

21

378

29

10

38

16

59

259

COFI: Corporate Finance-TRSA: Trading & Sales- REBA Retail Banking- COBA: Commercial Banking- PASE: Payment &
Settlement AGSE: Agency Services – ASMA: Asset management- REBR Retail Brokerage
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Table 1. 3 --US Bank Contributors’ Truncation Point ($ M)
Descriptive Statistics by Event Types
DAPA

EXFR

EPWS

INFR

EDPM

CPBP

BDSF

Number of Contributors

6

272

53

436

79

598

7

Minimum

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Maximum

89

242

52

1,899

417

1,980

363

Mean

23

13

9

27

15

30

61

Standard Deviation

6

5

3

12

7

11

12

Skewness

2

5

2

12

7

12

2

Excess Kurtosis

1

32

6

153

49

175

2

DAPA: Damage to Physical Asset- EXFR: External Fraud- EPWS: Employment Practices & Workplace Safety- INFR: Internal
FraudEDPM: Execution, Delivery & Process Management - CPBP: Clients, Products & Business Practice BDSF: Business Disruption &
System Failure

Table 1. 4 --US Insurer Contributors’ Truncation Point ($ M)
Descriptive Statistics by Event Types

DAPA EXFR
Number of Contributors

EPWS

INFR

EDPM

CPBP

BDSF

ALL

1

19

17

71

53

264

1

381

Minimum

208

1

1

1

1

1

341

1

Maximum

208

295

94

420

92

1,094

341

599

Mean

208

21

21

21

8

38

341

25

Standard Deviation

8

5

8

4

10

8

Skewness

4

2

5

4

7

5

Excess Kurtosis

14

1

31

14

69

37
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Table 1. 5 --US Bank & Insurer Contributors’ Truncation Point ($ M) by
Percentiles

Percentile

25%

50%

75%

95%

US Banks

2

4

12

80

US Insurers

2

6

19

120

102

Figure 1.1 --US Banks - Histogram of Contributor’s Log-Truncation-Point. –
All Business Lines and All Event Types

Frequency
100
80
60
40
20
2

4

Contributor 's Log−Truncation −Point

6

Figure 1.2 --US Insurers - Histogram of Contributor’s Log-Truncation-Point –
All Business Lines All Event Types

Frequency
50
40
30
20
10
1

2

3

4

5

6

103

Contributor's Log−Truncation −Point

Table 2. 1 -- US Banks and Insurers’ Total Revenue
Descriptive Statistics by Size

US Banks

US Insurers

No
Medium
Large Size
Exposure Small Size
Size
Reported
Number of
Contributors

723

383

113

26

3,458

33,118

Min

1

Max
Std

No
Medium
Exposure Small Size
Size
Reported
109

50

10

109,991

3,995

25,610

81,698

18,631

72,772

17

14,978

60,391

18,342

65,601

192,390

13,958

49,221

116,729

4,547

12,749

33,603

3,907

7,774

18,824

Skewness

1

1

1

1

1

1

Excess
Kurtosis

1

0

1

0

2

-1

Mean

213

Large
Size

Table 2. 2 --US Banks and Insurers’ Total Revenue by Percentile

Total
Total With
Number of Revenue
Losses
Reported

Min

25%
Percentile

50%
Percentile

75%
Percentile

Max

US Banks

1989

891

1

927

7,793

24,695

192,390

US
Insurers

530

250

17

3,055

9,241

26,158

116,729
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Figure 3.1 --US Banks Yearly Aggregate Losses By Business Lines & Settlement Year
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Total Business Lines
3- REBA Retail Banking
6- AGSE Agency Services

1- COFI Corporate Finance
4- COBA Commercial Banking
7- ASMA Asset management

105

2- TRSA Trading & Sales
5- PASE Payment & Settlement
8- REBR Retail Brokerage

Figure 3.2 --US Banks - Yearly Aggregate Losses By Event Types & Settlement Year
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Figure 3.3 --US Banks - Yearly Aggregate Losses By CPBP Sub Event Types & Settlement Year
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Figure 3.4 --US Insurers - Yearly Aggregate Losses By Event Types & Settlement Year

4500
4000

Yearly Aggregate Loss

3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
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Figure 3.5 --US Insurers - Yearly Aggregate Losses By CPBP Sub Event Types & Settlement Year
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2001

2002

Figure 3.6 --US Banks & Insurers - Yearly Aggregate Loss by Event Types & Settlement Year
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Figure 3.7 --US Banks - Yearly Aggregate Loss Amounts & Occurrences by Settlement Year
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Figure 3.8 --US Insurers - Yearly Aggregate Loss Amounts & Occurrences by Settlement Year
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Table 4. 1 --US Banks - Total Loss Amount by Business Lines & Event Types

Internal External
Fraud
Fraud

Employment
Practices &
Workplace Safety

Clients, Products Damage to
& Business
Physical
Practices
Assets

Business
Execution, Delivery
Disruption &
& Process
Total
System Failures
Management

Corporate Finance

1,426

0

8

1,214

0

0

4

2,652

Trading & Sales

6,670

0

5

7,232

0

363

223

14,494

Retail Banking

3,623

1,830

292

13,409

22

3

990

20,169

Commercial Banking

3,605

2,843

327

3,491

213

128

42

10,649

Payment & Settlement

61

8

0

304

89

8

4

474

Agency Services

123

758

3

1,296

0

0

362

2,542

Asset management

2,046

204

111

3,249

0

0

532

6,143

Retail Brokerage

1,072

52

214

7,383

0

16

54

8,791

Total

18,626

5,695

961

37,579

324

519

2,212

65,915

113

Table 4. 2 --US Banks - Loss Occurrences by Business Lines & Event Types
Internal External
Fraud
Fraud

Employment
Practices &
Workplace Safety

Clients, Products Damage to
& Business
Physical
Practices
Assets

Execution, Delivery
Business
Disruption &
& Process
Total
System Failures
Management

Corporate Finance

12

0

1

62

0

0

1

76

Trading & Sales

48

0

2

60

0

1

8

119

Retail Banking

272

191

20

271

3

1

51

809

Commercial Banking

74

127

14

101

3

2

8

329

Payment & Settlement

6

2

0

13

1

1

1

24

Agency Services

13

3

1

44

0

0

4

65

Asset management

40

9

3

82

0

0

5

139

Retail Brokerage

69

12

33

293

0

3

18

428

Total

534

344

74

926

7

8

96

1989

Table 4. 3 -- US Insurers - Loss Occurrences by Business Lines & Event Types
Internal External
Fraud
Fraud
Total Loss Amount
Total Loss Occurrence

Employment
Practices &
Workplace Safety

Clients, Products Damage to
Physical
& Business
Assets
Practices

Execution, Delivery
Business
& Process
Total
Disruption &
Management
System Failures

1,616

411

573

19,214

208

341

648

23,011

74

21

20

344

1

1

68

529
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Table 5. 1 --US Banks & Insurers –Observed Loss Severity Distribution Parameters by Business Units/Event Types and
Random Truncation Distributional Assumptions
Business Units
US Banks
All Business Units

Event Types

All Event Types
CPBP
Internal Fraud EPWS
Other Event
Types

Investment Banking

All Event Types
CPBP

Banking

All Event Types
CPBP

Other Business Lines All Event Types
CPBP

Tail beta
Scale sigma
Constant Logistic Normal Logistic Normal
1.826
(0.052)
2.031
(0.091)

Location mu
LogLikelihood
AIC
# Loss Max
Logistic Normal Constant Logistic Normal Constant Logistic Normal
Loss

0.750 0.886
(0.086) (0.040)
0.848 0.935
(0.111) (0.050)

0.934
2.177
(0.104) (0.108)
0.890
1.835
(0.082) (0.102)

4.481
4.481
(0.417)
3.807
3.807
(0.513)
-

-3187

-3107

-3116

6376

6220

6235

1989 2243

-1582

-1518

-1522

3166

3042

3048

926 2243

1.648
0.778 0.908
(0.083) (0.185) (0.080)

1.054
2.429
(0.257) (0.266)

4.581
4.581
(1.040)

-936

-919

-921

1873

1845

1848

608 1899

1.560
(0.085)
2.550
(0.276)
2.535
(0.369)
1.755
(0.062)
2.079
(0.140)
1.733
(0.091)
1.813
(0.121)

0.352 0.805
(0.194) (0.118)
1.199 1.232
(0.288) (0.112)
1.041 1.099
(0.277) (0.126)
0.665 0.838
(0.104) (0.052)
0.978 1.018
(0.171) (0.069)
0.674 0.840
(0.136) (0.075)
0.634 0.831
(0.134) (0.088)

0.432
(0.287)
0.887
(0.116)
0.763
(0.106)
0.841
(0.140)
0.887
(0.088)
0.848
(0.175)
0.757
(0.159)

5.636
(0.357)
3.105
(1.018)
3.204
(0.944)
4.682
(0.444)
3.128
(0.750)
4.455
(0.666)
4.468
(0.617)

-657

-645

-650

1316

1298

1304

455 535.8

-378

-356

-356

757

717

716

195 1899

-235

-217

-218

473

440

439

122 1825

-1917

-1869

-1875

3836

3743

3755

1227 2000

-743

-710

-710

1488

1425

1425

429 2000

-879

-857

-860

1759

1720

1724

567 2243

-598

-579

-582

1198

1164

1168

375 2243

2.184
(0.129)
2.540
(0.220)

0.479 0.896
(0.084) (0.091)
0.598 0.857
(0.101) (0.079)

0.535
2.237
(0.098) (0.200)
0.591
1.743
(0.088) (0.118)

5.471
5.471
(0.294)
4.862
4.862
(0.331)
-

-942

-900

-912

1887

1806

1828

529 2272

-665

-609

-616

1331

1225

1236

344 2272

0.138
-

6.293
-

-263

-259

-262

527

524

529

185

2.621
(0.446)
1.611
(0.165)
1.464
(0.160)
2.176
(0.144)
1.648
(0.128)
2.146
(0.210)
2.037
(0.219)

5.636
3.105
3.204
4.682
3.128
4.455
4.468
-

US Insurers
All Event Types
CPBP
Other Event
Types

1.522
0.127 1.064
(0.119)
(0.426)

4.639
(3.893)

6.293
-

420

Investment Banking includes two business lines: Corporate Finance and Trading and Sales. Banking includes: Retail Banking, Commercial Banking, Payment & Settlement and
Agency Services. Other business lines include Asset Management and Retail brokerage. EPWS: Employment Practices and Workplace Safety
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Table 5. 2 --US Banks–Observed Loss Severity Distribution Parameters by Business Lines/Event Types and Random
Truncation Distributional Assumptions
Business Lines

Tail beta
Scale sigma
Constant Logistic Normal Logistic Normal
Corporate Finance All Event Types 2.106
0.930 0.961
0.644
1.191
(0.378) (0.249) (0.130)
(0.125) (0.166)
CPBP
1.994
0.656 0.722
0.550
1.156
(0.425) (0.237) (0.127)
(0.127) (0.164)
Trading & Sales
All Event Types 2.834
0.982 1.084
0.914
1.930
(0.407) (0.374) (0.154)
(0.243) (0.232)
CPBP
3.092
1.040 1.149
0.760
1.580
(0.716) (0.422) (0.196)
(0.165) (0.206)
Retail Banking
All Event Types
1.592 0.755 0.866
1.046
2.339
(0.066) (0.149) (0.066)
(0.210) (0.230)
CPBP
2.034
1.005 1.056
1.055
1.985
(0.162) (0.264) (0.099)
(0.165) (0.234)
Commercial
All Event Types
2.103 0.540 0.788
0.579
1.779
Banking
(0.167) (0.144) (0.086)
(0.150) (0.158)
CPBP
2.251
0.810 0.860
0.672
1.337
Payment &
Settlement
Agency Services

Event Types

All Event Types
All Event Types

Asset Management All Event Types
CPBP
Retail Brokerage

All Event Types
CPBP

Location mu
LogLikelihood
AIC
# Loss
Logistic Normal Constant Logistic Normal Constant Logistic Normal
2.507
2.507
-133
-122
-122
267
250
248
76
(0.857)
3.054
3.054
-105
-94
-94
212
194
192
62
(0.802)
4.813
4.813
-243
-227
-227
488
461
459
119
(1.213)
4.048
4.048
-128
-114
-115
257
235
234
60
(1.123)
4.253
4.253
-1185 -1166 -1169
2372
2339
2342
809
(0.910)
3.459
3.459
-463
-450
-450
929
906
905
271
(1.388)
4.741
4.741
(0.419)
3.455
3.455

(0.365) (0.305) (0.121)

(0.140) (0.161)

(0.985)

-

2.073
(0.358)
2.248
(0.274)
2.291
(0.380)
1.565
(0.092)
1.679
(0.123)

0.893
(0.253)
0.829
(0.310)
0.699
(0.394)
0.734
(0.150)
0.723
(0.151)

3.285
(2.292)
4.490
(1.220)
4.655
(1.234)
4.365
(0.584)
4.369
(0.646)

3.285
4.490
4.655
4.365
4.369
-

0.962
(0.536)
0.782
(0.349)
0.670
(0.424)
0.573
(0.107)
0.590
(0.119)

1.004
(0.182)
0.918
(0.138)
0.850
(0.173)
0.778
(0.085)
0.805
(0.099)

1.671
(0.340)
1.911
(0.258)
1.799
(0.300)
2.110
(0.257)
2.063
(0.270)
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Max
Loss
990
299
1899
1825
2000
2000

-574

-539

-544

1149

1084

1092

329

766

-183

-167

-166

368

339

337

101

415

-112

-107

-107

227

221

219

24
65

209
536

-252

-239

-240

505

485

484

139

967

-150

-141

-142

82

440

-620

-605

-608

1242

1217

1221

428 2243

-445

-432

-435

892

871

874

293 2243

Figure 5.1 - US Banks Underlying Loss Severity Distribution Parameter by Business Units and Random Truncation Point
Distributional Assumption

Tail Parameter by Business Units & Random Truncation Point Distributional Assumptions
3

Tail Parameter

2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
Investment Banking

Banking

Others
Business Units

Constant

Logistic

117

Normal

Insurance Companies

Figure 5.2 - US Banks Underlying Loss Severity Distribution Parameter by Business Lines and Random Truncation Point
Distributional Assumption
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Figure 5.3 --US Banks - Quantile-Quantile Plot All Business Lines All Event Types

Observed Quantile
Log[Loss]

Fitted QuantileLog[Loss]

Figure 5.4 --US Banks - Observed Severity Distribution and Underlying Severity
Distribution. All Business Lines All Event Types.
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Figure 5.5 --US Banks - QQ Plot CPBP
Observed Quantile
Log[Loss]

Fitted Quantile, Log[Loss]

Figure 5.6 --US Banks - Observed Severity Distribution and Underlying Severity
Distribution. CPBP.
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Figure 5.7 US Banks - QQ Plot Internal Fraud-EPWS
Observed Quantile
Log[Loss]

Fitted Quantile, Log[Loss]

Figure 5.8 US Banks - Observed Severity Distribution and Underlying Severity
Distribution. Internal Fraud - EPWS.
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Figure 5.9 US Banks- Observed Severity Distribution and Underlying Severity
Distribution. Retail Banking.
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Log[Loss]
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Figure 5.10 US Banks- Observed Severity Distribution and Underlying Severity
Distribution Retail Banking.
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Figure 5.11 US Banks- Observed Severity Distribution and Underlying Severity
Distribution. Retail Brokerage
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Figure 5.12 US Banks- Observed Severity Distribution and Underlying Severity
Distribution Retail Brokerage.
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Table 5. 3 --US Banks & Insurers: Underlying Loss Severity by Exposure (Revenue) All Business Lines and Event Types

Bellow Median Revenue

Above Median Revenue

Number of
Losses

Severity
Parameter

Maximum
Loss($M)

99.95% Percentile of the
Underlying Severity
($M)

Number of
Losses

Severity
Parameter

99.95% Percentile of
Maximum Loss
the Underlying Severity
($M)
($M)

US Banks

582

0.759

2,243

320

446

0.6794

1,824

175

US Insurers

125

0.6108

2,272

104

125

0.512

1,852

49

Table 5. 4 --US Banks & Insurers: Loss Severity by Exposure (Revenue) All Business Lines and Event Types

US Banks

US Insurers

Small Size

Medium Size

Large Size

Small Size

Medium Size

Large Size

Number of Losses

582

243

64

144

88

11

Severity Parameter

0.878

0.497

0.322

0.571

0.598

Maximum Loss ($M)

2,243

631

363

2,272

1,852

790

44

12

76

94

99.99% Percentile of the
Underlying Loss Severity
($M)

124

198

Table 5. 5 – Observed Loss Severity Distribution Parameters Industry-Wide Organization vs Specific Firm

Severity Distribution Parameter
Prob[Truncation Point <= Specific PML]
PML ($M)

Median ($M)

Tail beta

Location mu

Scale sigma

Industry-Wide Organization

2,243

88

0.931

0.750

4.481

0.934

Specific Firm

1,000

88

0.99

0.472

4.481

0.528

125

Figure 5.13 – Random Truncation Point Distribution CDF
Industry-Wide Organization vs Specific Firm

Figure 5.14 – Random Truncation Point Distribution PDF
Industry-Wide Organization vs Specific Firm
fHHxL -- t1 = 4.48 b1 = 0.93 t2 = 4.48 b2= 0.53
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1

CDFIndustry

-5

CDFSpecific

126

5

10

15

x

Table 5. 6 US Banks and Insurers: Sample Rank & Linear Correlation by Business Unit/Event types
Kendall Rank
Adjusted Sample
Sample Correlation Linear Correlation

Class

Business Units

Event Types

Number of
Losses

Amount ($M)

Severity
Parameter

Weight

1

All Business Units

CPBP

926

37,579

0.848

0.466

1

0.33

1

0.1

All Business Units

Other Event Types

1063

28,336

0.659

0.534

0.33

1

0.1

1

All Business Units

CPBP

926

37,579

0.848

0.466

1

1

0.1

0.1

All Business Units

Internal Fraud

608

19,587

0.778

0.306

0.33

1

0.73

0.1

1

0.1

All Business Units

Other Event Types

455

8,749

0.352

0.229

0.60

0.73

1

0.1

0.1

1

Insurance

CPBP

344

19,214

0.598

0.650

1

0.20

1

0.1

Insurance

Other Event Types

185

3,797

0.127

0.350

0.20

1

0.1

1

2

3

* Adjusted Sample Linear Correlation Matrices are Positive Definite
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0.33 0.60

# Yearly
Claims
50

50

50

Table 5. 7 --US Banks and Insurers
Capital Charge’s Sensitivity to the Truncation Point Distributional Assumption All
Business Lines and All Event Types.

Constant

Logistic

Normal

Severity Tail
b

VaR ($M)

Severity Tail
b

VaR ($M)

Severity Tail
b

VaR ($M)

US Banks

1.826

>100,000

0.750

2,089

0.886

8,220

US
Insurers

2.184

>100,000

0.479

180

0.896

8,633

Assuming yearly number of loss occurrences exceeding $1M equal to 25

Table 5. 8 – US Banks and Insurers
Capital Charge ($M) Assuming Various Yearly Number of Loss Occurrences

Yearly Number of Loss Occurrences in Excess of $1M

Severity Tail b
5

10

25

50

70

US Banks

0.750

599

1,041

2,106

3,562

4,596

US Insurers

0.479

70

104

179

278

350

Table 5. 9 -- US Banks and Insurers
Capital Charge ($M) for Three Business Line and Event Type Combinations

All Business Lines &
Event Types

CPBP - Other Event Types

VaR

VaR

VaR Increase
%

US Banks

3,460

5,653

63.4

US Insurers

285

611

114.6

CPBP- Internal Fraud- Other
Event Types
VaR Increase
VaR
%
6,324

Assuming a yearly number of loss occurrences exceeding $1M equal to 50
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82.8

Figure 5.15 --US Banks
CPBP Capital Charge Distribution ($M)
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Figure 5.16 --US Banks
Internal Fraud Capital Charge Distribution ($M)
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Figure 5.17 --US Banks
Other Event Types Capital Charge Distribution ($M)

Frequency
100
80
60
40
20
48.5

49

49.5

50
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Figure 5.18 --US Banks
Aggregated Capital Charge Distribution ($M) Using Cauchy Copula

Frequency
120
100
80
60
40
20
5500 6000 6500 7000 7500 8000

Aggregated Capital Charge Cauchy- copula

Figure 5.19 -- US Banks
Aggregated Capital Charge ($M) for the Student’s t -Copula
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Table 5. 10 -- US Banks
Capital Charges ($M) and Capital Savings ($M) by Types of Copulas.

Industry-Wide Bank

Degrees of freedom

VaR

Capital Saving
Amount

%

Specific Bank
VaR

Capital Saving
Amount

%

Comonotonic

7,015

0

0.00

481

0

0.00

1 - Cauchy

6,582

433

6.58

448

33

7.26

2

6,509

506

7.77

446

35

7.81

3

6,468

547

8.45

444

36

8.17

4

6,435

580

9.01

443

37

8.41

5

6,416

599

9.33

442

38

8.68

6

6,400

615

9.61

441

39

8.88

7

6,391

624

9.77

441

40

9.00

8

6,381

634

9.93

440

40

9.17

9

6,374

641

10.06

440

41

9.26

10

6,373

642

10.07

440

41

9.30

Infinite- Normal 6,317

698

11.05

437

44

10.02

724

11.52

433

47

10.92

Independent

6,290

Banks’ activities are classified into three event types: CPBP – Internal Fraud & EPWS and Other Event Types.
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Table 5. 11 -- US Insurers
Capital Charges ($M) and Capital Saving ($M) by Types of Copulas.

Industry-Wide Insurer

Degrees of freedom

VaR

Capital Saving
Amount

%

Specific Insurer
VaR

Capital Saving
Amount

%

Comonotonic

625

0

0.00

125

0

0.00

1 - Cauchy

612

14

2.24

119

6

4.91

2

611

15

2.43

118

7

5.92

3

611

15

2.42

117

8

6.84

4

610

15

2.50

117

9

7.53

5

611

15

2.41

116

9

8.04

6

611

15

2.40

116

10

8.38

7

611

14

2.37

115

10

8.65

8

611

15

2.38

115

10

8.84

9

610

15

2.44

115

10

9.01

10

610

15

2.44

115

10

9.14

Infinite- Normal 608

18

2.91

113

12

10.43

19

3.16

112

13

11.78

Independent

606

Insurers’ activities are classified into two event types: CPBP and Other Event Types
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Table 5. 12 --US Bank
Descriptive Statistics of the Capital Charge ($M)

Degrees of freedom

Max
Min
Excess
Mean St-Dev Median 95-Perc 99-Perc Confidence Confidence Skewness
Kurtosis
Interval
Interval

1 - Cauchy

6,582

455

6,560

7,353

7,717

6,552

6,612

0.26

-0.07

2

6,509

456

6,485

7,284

7,650

6,479

6,539

0.29

0.04

3

6,468

457

6,436

7,262

7,610

6,438

6,498

0.30

0.09

4

6,435

454

6,404

7,205

7,584

6,405

6,465

0.30

0.13

5

6,416

456

6,392

7,204

7,572

6,386

6,446

0.32

0.18

6

6,400

451

6,376

7,160

7,575

6,370

6,430

0.30

0.23

7

6,391

451

6,371

7,149

7,576

6,361

6,420

0.31

0.18

8

6,381

448

6,358

7,142

7,528

6,351

6,410

0.32

0.33

9

6,374

448

6,354

7,140

7,536

6,344

6,403

0.30

0.15

10

6,373

453

6,349

7,142

7,516

6,343

6,403

0.34

0.24

InfiniteNormal

6,317

436

6,298

7,083

7,384

6,288

6,345

0.29

0.22

Independent 6,290

436

6,279

7,037

7,342

6,262

6,319

0.27

0.16
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Degrees of freedom

Table 5. 13 -- Mixing Weights by types of copulas

Comonotonic

4%

1 - Cauchy

8%

2

8%

3

8%

4

8%

5

8%

6

8%

7

8%

8

8%

9

8%

10

8%

Infinite- Normal

8%

Independent

8%
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Table 5. 14 --US Industry-Wide Bank & Specific Bank
Descriptive Statistics of the Mixing Weighted Capital Charges ($M)

Industry-Wide Bank

Specific Bank

Minimum

5,892

410

Maximum

7,007

481

Mean

6,433

443

Median

6,431

443

1% Percentile

6,071

422

5% Percentile

6,234

431

95% Percentile

6,639

455

99.9% Percentile

6,830

467

Confidence Interval 1

6,433

443

Confidence Interval 2

6,434

443

Skewness

0.10

0.08

Excess Kurtosis

0.00

0.00
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Figure 5-20 US Industry-wide Bank
Base Scenario Histogram of the Mixing Weighted Capital Charges

Frequency
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
6000

6200

6400

6600

6800

Mixing Weighted Capital Charges
7000

Figure 5-21 US Specific Bank
Base Scenario Histogram of the Mixing Weighted Capital Charges
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Figure 6.1
Coefficient of Upper Tail Dependence for Student’s t-Copula

UpperTail Dependence l
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
DF n=1
0.1
DF n=2

DF n=3

137

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

Correlation r

Table 5. 15 -- Capital Charges by Common Shock Intensity

Log
Business Event
Loss
Industry
Units Types Severity
Tail

Maximal Yearly
Moment Number
of
of Loss
Severity Losses

Common Shock Intensity52
1 loss per year
Correlation
Loss
Frequency

Aggregate
Losses

Banks

Capital Charges
($M)
Min Mean Max
72

All

CPBP

Common Shock Intensity
2 losses per year

73

Correlation
Loss
Frequency

Aggregate
Losses

73

0.393

2

9

1 0.14 0.15

1 0.10 0.11

1 0.27 0.30

1 0.20 0.23

All

Internal
0.244
Fraud

4

6

0.14 1 0.18

0.10 1 0.17

0.27 1 0.37

0.20 1 0.34

All

Others

12

5

0.15 0.18 1

0.11 0.17 1

0.30 0.37 1

0.23 0.34 1

0.080

Insurers

59
-

CPBP

0.342

2

13

-

Others

0.046

21

7

1 0.10
0.10 1

1 0.09
0.09 1

52

59

60
1 0.21
0.21 1

Capital Charges
($M)
Min Mean Max
74

75

76

60

60

61

1 0.18
0.18 1

Following Powojowski et al. (2002) model, the dependency between loss event type frequency is generated by a single enterprise-wide source of loss that
follows a Poisson distribution with intensity λ
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APPENDIX I
Table A. 1. Risk Weights by Category of On-Balance-Sheet Asset BCBS (1988)
Category of on-balance-sheet asset
(a) Cash
(b) Claims on central governments and central banks denominated in
national currency and funded in that currency
(c) Other claims on OECD central governments3 and central banks
(d) Claims collateralized by cash of OECD central-government
securities3 or guaranteed by OECD central governments

Risk weights
0%

(a) Claims on domestic public-sector entities, excluding central
government, and loans guaranteed4 by such entities

0, 10, 20 or 50%
At national discretion

(a) Claims on multilateral development banks (IBRD, IADB, AsDB,
AfDB, EIB53 and claims guaranteed by, or collateralized by
securities issued by such bank
(b) Claims on banks incorporated in the OECD and loans guaranteed4
by OECD incorporated banks
(c) Claims on banks incorporated in countries outside the OECD with a
residual maturity of up to one year and loans with a residual
maturity of up to one year guaranteed by banks incorporated in
countries outside the OECD
(d) Claims on non-domestic OECD public-sector entities, excluding
central government, and loans guaranteed4 by such entities
(e) Cash items in process of collection

20%

(a) Loans fully secured by mortgage on residential property that is or 50%
will be occupied by the borrower or that is rented
100%
(a) Claims on the private sector
(b) Claims on banks incorporated outside the OECD with a residual
maturity of over one year
(c) Claims on central governments outside the OECD (unless
denominated in national currency - and funded in that currency (d) Claims on commercial companies owned by the public sector
(e) Premises, plant and equipment and other fixed assets
(f) Real estate and other investments (including non-consolidated
investment participations in other companies)
(g) Capital instruments issued by other banks (unless deducted from
capital)
(h) all other assets
53

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Inter-American Development Bank
(IADB), Asian Development Bank (AsDB), African Development Bank (AfDB), European Investment
Bank (EIB)

139

Table A. 2. BCBS Business Lines

Business Lines

Beta Factors

Corporate finance

18%

Trading and sales

18%

Retail banking

12%

Commercial banking

15%

Payment and settlement

18%

Agency services

15%

Asset management

12%

Retail brokerage

12%
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